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RS 310-75

Approved For Release 2014/08/21 : CIA-RDP80T00608R000600170025-2

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Social Transformation in the Arab World, Morocco: etc.,

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Research Study

Social Transformation in the Arab World

Morocco: A Case of Undirected Change

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OPR-310

June 1975

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S 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH

June 1975

MOROCCO: A CASE OF UNDIRECTED CHANGE

Part I of the Series

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE ARAB WORLD

In the preparation of this study, the Office of Political Research consulted other offices of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State. Their comments and suggestions were appreciated and used, but no attempt at formal coordination was undertaken. Further comments will be welcomed by the author, [REDACTED] (Code 143, x5492).

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FOREWORD

This study is the first in a series on social transformation in the Arab world, undertaken through case studies of selected Arab countries and societies. The Office of Political Research begins this series with the aims of identifying the factors which have inhibited or promoted change in the Arab world and gauging the present abilities of those societies to respond effectively to their needs and problems. The studies will also help to determine the degree of likelihood that further change will come in the form of stable, evolutionary development or through turbulence and revolution.

The emphases of the country studies will vary, ranging from analyses of elite groups and developing new classes to assessments of the gaps between national goals and actual accomplishments. Such variation is dictated by the nature of the societies and by the availability of source material which yields data useful for intelligence purposes. While the series will lay the groundwork for comparisons of the Arab countries, differences among them may be as revealing as their similarities.

Morocco was selected as the first of these country studies because change is taking place there within the confines of the traditional order. This study, in essence, shows: the slow adaptation of that order; the interaction between education and other aspects of change, particularly the importance of qualitative educational reform; the emergence of the bureaucracy as an instrument of change; and the social repercussions—as well as the likely political effects—of these developments.

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OBJECTIVES AND FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

Since the two coup attempts of 1971-72, Western attention to Morocco has focused on the likely staying power of King Hassan's regime. Many observers have charged that the King's mode of leadership contributed to the creation of a situation conducive to coups. They have pointed out that he rules through manipulating and balancing political forces and interest groups and that he has not concentrated his efforts on the social and economic betterment of his people.

Nonetheless, social and economic change for the better is underway in Morocco. Examination of this change, under conditions of Hassan's style of governing, thus serves as a case study of a development process lacking in strong, top-level direction and uncomplicated by revolution. In undertaking such an examination, this study is specifically directed toward: 1) identifying the factors which have impeded more rapid change, as measured in economic development and efforts to improve the material conditions of the people and strengthen their participatory role; 2) locating—by such means as comparing census results—the areas where change is occurring; and 3) gauging the likely effects of Hassan's regime and of possible successor regimes on the future pace of change.

The approach to the examination of change is empirical, with no attempt made to adhere to a particular model of development formulated by social scientists. Instead, important sectors in which change might take place—including the educational system, the economy, and land reform—have been briefly surveyed and found to yield evidence of improved ability to cope with national problems. These surveys have also provided data on the pace of change, indicating that trends toward professionalism and realism did not begin to emerge in the operations of the Moroccan government until roughly 12 to 14 years after the country won its independence in 1956.

The change which is taking place in Morocco reflects the emergence of the technocrats, i.e., the professionals, managers, and technicians, and the added authority given them by the King, who displays little interest in domestic administration. With the technocrats in the bureaucracy thus relatively free to design and implement development programs, the economy has been achieving an average annual growth rate of about 7 percent since 1972, in contrast to the average of under 3

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percent of the early and mid-1960's. Distribution of land taken from foreign owners is benefitting increasing numbers of previously landless farmers. The bureaucracy's efforts have kept a high unemployment rate from getting worse, at least in terms of percentage of the labor force. And the educational system is slowly but systematically improving in quality and turning out the trained specialists the development of the nation requires. Taken together, these upward trends give Morocco a considerable potential for social transformation.

Change in Morocco does not imply the initiation of a comprehensive, dynamic program for domestic betterment or a new style of leadership on the part of Hassan, who continues to rule by an adroit mix of force, cajolery, and political manipulation. The King sets general guidelines but gives little specific direction to development efforts.


This lack of direction, over the long term, may be beneficial to the country. An undirected society is also an unregimented one. And for a country controlled by an autocratic regime such as Hassan's, Morocco has some unusual features. Opposition political parties are functioning; the major trade union has, with partial exceptions, successfully resisted subordination to governmental authority; and a relatively free press criticizes the regime. All operate within limits circumscribed by Hassan, but segments of the population have acquired a political or group identity and have the freedom to articulate their demands. Should Hassan eventually risk the dispersion of power, the political and other interest groups might then be ready to share positions of trust and responsibility. Over the long term, they could establish a government that offers greater potential for future stability than the present system of one-man rule.

Speculation on Hassan's staying power is not a major purpose of this study. The topic is treated, however, because the King's tenure on the throne makes Morocco a test case in the efforts to determine the extent to which the developmental process necessarily entails political and social disruption. The odds—if they are set by the number of fallen monarchies since World War II—are against his continued reign. Moreover, Morocco shares the problems of many nations whose leaders have fallen and, in fact, of most developing countries: the population is growing rapidly and gaps between city and countryside and between rich and poor are wide.

Yet the fortunes of Hassan's regime have improved since the attempts to topple him in 1971 and 1972. In the worldwide explosion of commodity prices, Morocco faces shortages but it has fared better than most countries because it is the leading exporter of phosphates, which are

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used in the fertilizers essential to modern agriculture and whose price quadrupled between 1972 and 1975. In world affairs, the closer alignment with the Arabs Hassan has sought, formalized by sending troops into the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, has been domestically popular and is paying off in terms of aid from the oil-rich states. Although Hassan has ruled alone for most of his reign, and the two parliaments that were elected were virtually powerless, he is again making overtures to the politicians about their participation in the Cabinet, and he has talked about holding elections.



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THE EXAMINATION OF CHANGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Change is easier to measure in Morocco than in many countries. It is a curious fact of history that, despite the nation's proximity to Europe, continuity of the traditional order prevails there as in no Arab land outside the Arabian peninsula. The beginnings of change are thus more clearly apparent, and its slow pace and limited scope simplify the following of its course.

Officially the nation is called the Sharifian Empire of Morocco, meaning that it is ruled by a Sharifian family, i.e., one whose members claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Hassan thus draws his legitimacy from Islam, and he combines religious and temporal authority. His Alaonite dynasty dates from the 17th century, and the throne itself goes back to the 8th century. When the Ottomans held the rest of North Africa and most of the Middle East in the 1600-1800's, the tribes within Morocco managed to stave them off, using as a counterweight Spanish and Portuguese influence in the coastal areas. The country in consequence preserved its separateness and royal succession.

The French in this century held Morocco for almost 50 years (see chronology), but their occupation was far shorter than the periods of foreign domination in most Arab countries. Moreover, the French left the existing social and political orders surprisingly intact. They took the land they wanted but beyond that they did not disturb the interests of the tribes, the merchant families, and the religious dignitaries; and they maintained the pretense of ruling through the Moroccan monarch. Nor did the monarchy suffer from being associated with the French. Mohammed V, Hassan's father, supported the nationalist movement, which had been organized by traditional elite groups. When he was exiled by the French in 1953, he became the rallying symbol for Moroccan independence. Then resistance groups began to tie down troops which the French could ill afford to spare because of their preoccupation with Algeria. In the end, France capitulated, restored Mohammed to the throne in 1955, and granted Morocco's independence six months later. The traditional order thus survived the colonial period

without the usual fate of being either disrupted by the occupying power or discredited by association with it.

Another reason Morocco lends itself to a study of change is the availability of material. The society—with the exception of the royal establishment and the military (and this latter exception dates only from the wraps put on the army following the 1971-72 coup attempts)—has been more open and accessible to Western scholars and observers in the last two decades than has that of almost any other Arab country. Social scientists, historians, etc., have swarmed over Morocco, studying the dichotomy so often posited between "traditional" and "modern" societies and tending to concentrate on the relationships among the tribes and other family-oriented groups of the old order. The result is a rich body of literature on which to draw in understanding the problems of effecting change in Morocco.¹

This literature has also contributed to a negative interpretation of Moroccan events. Hassan's method of playing off political leaders and important families against one another has been rightly found to be a hold-over from past centuries. The activities of the government he dominates have been variously described as haphazard, hesitant, fanciful, and ineffective.² Much criticism has focused on the government's poor record in formulating and implementing economic

¹Outstanding among the scholars who have explored the tribal components of Moroccan society are Ernest Gellner and David M. Hart. Their findings are available in numerous articles and monographs, two of which were incorporated in the recent collection *Arabs and Berbers*, ed. by Gellner and Charles Meaud, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Mass., 1972. The culmination of these and other studies, which emphasize the "segmented" nature of traditional Morocco, is John Waterbury's *The Commander of the Faithful - A Study of Segmented Politics*, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1970. In his interpretative and perceptive history of the first decade of Morocco's independence (1956-66), he analyzes the political conduct of the elite as a manifestation of traditional patterns of behavior. Even if the causal relationship he hypothesizes concerning behavior is denied (and certainly the Moroccan elite would be the first to reject the concept that their actions are anachronistic), the parallels he points between the near and distant past are an argument for continuity in the society.

²See, for example, Charles Gallagher, *The Moroccan Economy in Perspective*, American Universities Field Staff, 1966, and Rabat, A-43, 6 March 1971.

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plans, on the cautious land-reform measures, and on taxation practices that leave most of the national income in the hands of a small percentage of the people. Morocco's development efforts have often been compared unfavorably with those of Tunisia, which accomplished more with fewer resources.

Preoccupation with top-level government activities and with political ups-and-downs has obscured the more fundamental developments in Morocco. Fact-finding studies on the changes that are taking place in the society, and in particular on the evolution of modern professional classes, have been neglected. Insufficient attention has been given to the socio-economic effect of these technocrats and the increased efficiency they are bringing to the bureaucracy, though there has been no fundamental change in the nature or scope of palace operations.

A new look at Morocco, factoring in the trends toward professionalism and improved bureaucratic performance, is thus in order. It is called for by the admonition

"... it is high time to do away with the outdated image of an unstable and unserious Morocco, an image which still haunts many of the world's government offices, including some located in Washington."³

II. THE ABSENCE OF SYSTEMATIC DIRECTION

A. Causal Factors

Morocco had a number of advantages when it became an independent state in 1956. The struggle to force the French to give up their protectorate had been won with relative ease, and in the course of it the people had demonstrated strong national feeling and an ability to unite for a common cause. Political leaders had emerged, and Mohammed V was a popular head of state.

Why did neither the King nor the political leaders initiate a dynamic program of economic and social reform and mobilize the nation for development efforts? Why were such efforts allowed to lag? Morocco is not one of the have-not nations. While one of the most populous of the Arab states,⁴ it has far more

usable agricultural land than most of them. Once a net exporter of grain, it could become one again if it utilized new methods for increasing yields, and it has other resources as well, notably phosphates. Yet the economy stagnated, rural conditions worsened, slums proliferated, and government efforts to cope with these problems—or even to formulate them—were half-hearted and vacillating. Economic policies continued to be—and still are—far more laissez faire than those which most developing countries espouse, although the public sector has expanded. In general, projects for economic and social betterment before about 1968 were often announced but rarely implemented.

Top-level direction of development efforts is still lacking. Official initiative on the part of the King's Cabinet members, if any has been taken, has not been recorded. The King sets the guidelines in a rhetorical way, but he does not concentrate his energies on bringing about his proclaimed goal of a modernized Morocco. He seeks to preserve fundamental patterns of the present system, and he has neither enunciated an ideology of reform nor instituted a program of planned change. In this, he differs from the many national leaders of North Africa and the Middle East who have pushed for social change—although the implementation of their programs has varied widely and the type of change desired has ranged from the "Cultural Revolution" of Libya's Qaddafi—which took its name from the Chinese and its inspiration from Islamic fundamentalism—to the "White Revolution" of the Iranian Shah. It is with Iran that Morocco contrasts most obviously. There change is being imposed from the top, in the form of the Shah's revolution, while in Morocco change is coming from below the high levels of government.

The answer to the question of why top-level direction has been lacking in Morocco must be sought in a combination of historic, political, and economic circumstances. The reasons are basically threefold:

[REDACTED] an economic system which derives much of its strength from the control of the elite over land and business and which is thus not easily adaptable to the development process; and the divisiveness of the society, both in pre-colonial times and today. This divisiveness is characteristic of many Arab countries. In Morocco it renders united action

³ [REDACTED] 7 January 1975. 25X1A2g

⁴ Morocco, with an estimated population of 17 million, follows Egypt and the Sudan as the third most populous of the Arab countries.

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difficult and deters the development of credible alternatives to the King's rule.

1. The Divisiveness of the Society

Morocco has no tradition of a strong ruler. The sultans relied historically on the support of often contending tribes and, though the country's independence was thus maintained, internal conditions of near anarchy prevailed. Before the establishment of the French protectorate, the main division of the country was between the *bled al makhzen*,⁵ or lands of government, and the *bled al siba*, or lands of dissidence. The latter was free of *makhzen* taxes and military levies, and the tribes that composed it maintained that status as long as they could repel the forces of the sultan. Usually the *makhzen* comprised the towns and the lowlands and the *siba* was a phenomenon of the mountains and the desert, but the distinction between the two was sharp neither in time nor in geography.

The *makhzen* and the *siba* were bound together by adherence to Sunni Islam and recognition of the religious authority of the sultan. In Morocco the designation of the ruler followed—and follows today—a variation of Islamic tradition in that it provides not for primogeniture but rather for selection by religious dignitaries (the *ulema*), who were in fact usually practical enough to accept the reigning monarch's preference. Yet as the sultans' authority was based on Islam, which was considered the sole source of law and wisdom, most of them were either disinterested in or opposed to social change.

The rulers, in any case, had no more than a limited capability to enforce an initiative or bring about change, for they had no monopoly of coercive power. The support of the tribes that composed the *makhzen* was always necessary to back up the rulers' small independent army. Thus each sultan constructed alliances and maneuvered to keep any one tribal grouping from becoming strong enough to challenge him. When he was not successful, the result was a change of dynasty—five of which preceded the Alaouites' coming to power. Basically, the system the rulers maintained was a balance-of-power arrangement.

⁵Literally the word *makhzen* means storehouse in Arabic. Its application to government points to the fact that the main purpose of the administration of the sultan (the title used by Mohammed V's predecessors) was the collection of taxes.

Within the tribes infinite numbers of smaller balance-of-power arrangements prevailed. Recent studies have refuted the historic simplification of the tribal order in Morocco, finding that the control actually exercised by any group over its component parts was a complex and changing matter.⁶ Many of the tribes consisted of heterogeneous clans who formed alliances on the basis of pasturage rights, use of water, or other benefits to be derived from the association. Leadership often shifted according to the strength of the family or clan, and in general it was exercised only during feuds and wars.


Failure to understand the fragmentary nature of this society has led on occasion to Western misjudgment of its problems. The Arab-Berber antagonism, for example, first stressed by the French at the time of their protectorate to further their divide-and-rule policies, continues to be overemphasized. The bases for this concern are various. Estimates of the number of Moroccans who speak a Berber dialect as a first language range from 25 percent to almost 50 percent of the population, and language is an important dividing line in most societies. (Berbers were indigenous to the land and, as Arab immigration from the Middle East was never great, the population today consists essentially of the Arabized Berber majority, i.e., those who adopted the Arabic language and consider themselves Arabs, and the Berber minority.) Moreover, many of those who speak a Berber dialect live in mountainous areas and hold to tribal ways. Perhaps because they thus resemble the Kurds in some respects, Westerners have tended to forecast separatist movements among them; and the fact that the Moroccan government is today silent on the Berber component of the population leads to the suspicion that it is attempting to gloss over a potentially threatening situation.

The Berbers, however, have never displayed a strong sense of solidarity among themselves. In Morocco they are concentrated in areas which shade into one another (see map), but language does not supply a bond. Berber is not a written tongue and, according to most investigators, it is divided in Morocco into three separate dialects which are mutually intelligible only with difficulty. For the most part, group intercommunication has been found to take place in Arabic. Moreover, the range of interaction between Arabs and

⁶Gellner and Hart, *op. cit.* See also Gellner's "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa," *French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity*, ed. by W. H. Lewis, Walker and Co., New York, 1965.

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AREAS OF BERBER CONCENTRATION AND THE MAJOR DIALECTS SPOKEN



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Berbers is great. All cities and towns contain both Arabs and Berbers, and intermarriage is not uncommon.⁷ In fact, King Hassan's principal wife within the harem and also his mother come from families who retain their Berber identity.

Ethnicity is, to be sure, one means of identity, but in Morocco there have been many others of equal or greater importance. Patterns for establishing social cohesion, or even for determining friend or foe, were historically complex and intricate, involving such attributes as blood relationship, family origin, residence, geographic proximity of other families, personal bonds between other family members, shared trade or craft, and allegiance to a local saintly figure, living or dead (one of the *marabouts*). Largely for this reason, no drive for ethnic affirmation developed among the Berbers; the society was too fragmented to lend itself to such a movement.

The basic divisions of the society were not greatly affected by the French occupation. Geographic factors inhibited penetration and left rural areas—where over 80 percent of the people lived in the early 1900's and about 65 percent still do—largely untouched by modern life. The tribes lost their power of military resistance and their administrative functions were altered, but they continued to divide the country into diverse social units. Moreover, some new dividing lines were drawn by the French. They educated small numbers in Western ways, thus effecting an overlay of French culture and adding another dimension to the gulf separating the urban elite from the masses. They introduced the French-Arabic language dichotomy, which troubles the nation to this day (see below, under the Language of Education), and they created the nucleus of a modern economy, which had the results of further separating town from countryside and of establishing another division among the members of the Moroccan elite.

Traditionally the Moroccan elite was composed of wealthy merchants, regional chieftains, religious dignitaries, and those who had illustrious ancestry or had been favored by the monarch. Educated members of this group were historically concentrated in Fes, long a center of Islamic learning and the pace-setter in Moroccan culture. They held the initial

edge in acceding to privileged positions in the market economy opened up by the French, and they have managed to retain them, largely because independent Morocco has held to laissez-faire economic policies. For some members of the elite, the source of power thus shifted from its traditional base to the more modern one of monetary wealth, and they educated their sons in France. For others, however, such was not the case.

The divisions in the elite became manifest during the independence struggle when its members formed the nationalist movement. Leadership was in the hands of the Istiqlal party, which was conservative and religious in origin. Its founders were intellectuals in Fes who had come together in the 1930's, under the leadership of the religious scholar Allal al-Fassi, to promote the reform of Islam. As the group gradually became a party espousing nationalist goals, its membership came to include younger, Western-educated partisans of a liberal bent. It was supported by rural leaders and tribal chiefs, who formed the Army of Liberation to fight the French in the countryside, and also by members of the urban resistance, who looked to labor leaders for their direct guidance and thus bestowed upon them, in terms of authority, a semi-elite status.

The solidarity this movement displayed during the independence struggle was the old Moroccan ability to unite at time of crisis and against a common foe. It was unity lacking in concepts of nationhood and of the principles of peacetime leadership, which include acceptance of subordinate roles and of guidance and direction. Once independence was won, rural leaders in particular began to assert separatist tendencies. In Tifilalt they openly defied authority, and in the Rif mountains they rebelled. Their aims were not autonomy. Instead, their sentiments seemed to derive from the traditional tribal opposition to central control. They objected mainly to centrally appointed officials, especially those associated with the old-guard of the Istiqlal, who came to serve in their areas as judges and administrators.

Regional animosities played a part in this opposition to the Istiqlal. The dominant position of party members from the prestigious families of Fes was resented by the rest of the country. As the livelihood of these families often depended on commerce or real estate, they were called the Fassi bourgeoisie, and that term has become much used to apply to the upper levels of the whole of the Moroccan business com-

⁷According to a survey made in 1960 in the city of Sefrou (whose population then was slightly over 20,000), one out of eight marriages was mixed Arab-Berber. See Lawrence Rosen, "The Social and Conceptual Framework of Arab-Berber Relations in Central Morocco," *Arabs and Berbers, op. cit.*, pp. 155-174.

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munity, centered though it now is in Casablanca and Rabat. Connections with Fes may be remote or even non-existent; the appellation connotes membership in what is considered to be the clique at the apex of Moroccan society.

Concepts of Fassi domination persist largely because regional identities remain strong throughout the society. Inhabitants of the Rif mountains, for example, refer to themselves as the Riffi, suggesting individualism and independence. Even many long-time city dwellers retain a pride in their regional background; and some—such as the Berber migrants to Casablanca from the Sous River valley—form loosely knit, mutual-help groups to assist one another in business. Through such means, for example, the Soussi have established a near monopoly of the retail grocery trade in Casablanca and in other Moroccan cities as well.

Voting patterns illustrate these regional divisions of the society. Although elections have been too few and too closely controlled by the government to supply much information, those held for parliament in 1963 and for the Casablanca Chamber of Commerce and Industry throughout the mid-1960's yield some data. They were surprising in that Casablanca businessmen and tradesmen supported a party avowedly socialist and revolutionary, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), as opposed to the more conservative and better established Istiqlal. Plainly many of the tradesmen, particularly the Soussi, were voting not for the UNFP but against the Istiqlal because it was associated with the Fassi bourgeoisie. Party doctrines were less relevant than the commercial and cultural rivalries.

Subsequent UNFP attempts to transfer the party's success to the home territory of the Soussi, however, did not succeed. Politicians sought out in particular members of the Amnailn tribe, who had helped them in Casablanca, but they found that clan and village rivalries within that tribe were too strong to permit unity at the polls.⁸

To a greater extent than in many societies, this prevalence of regional, tribal, and family identities in Morocco limits loyalties to wider groups. Increased communication and urbanization are of course breaking down old barriers, and there is a trend toward the

development of national consciousness. Yet suspicion and distrust, bred of past divisiveness, continue to be characteristic of the culture.

2. The Monarchy

a. Consolidation and Use of Power

Consolidation of monarchical control was a slow process in Morocco. Mohammed V returned from exile as the symbol of Moroccan independence, but the political elite had attained it; and for the first three years after independence the King shared power with the politicians. Allal al-Fassi of the Istiqlal was the *za'im* (leader) of the independence movement, and his party members asserted their leadership. They compromised with the King by forming Cabinets which contained some independents but which were dominated by the Istiqlal, and their aim was to establish a constitutional monarchy and hold parliamentary elections. The King, instead of working through the Istiqlal to build a strong party, sought to weaken it by encouraging a rural-based party, the Popular Movement.

With this move Mohammed set the pattern for the divide-and-rule policies to which his son continues to adhere. Perhaps because of this traditionalist background, Mohammed did not view a political party as an instrument to refashion the society. He did not want to be subservient to the Istiqlal, and he did not try to dominate it—as he might have succeeded in doing. Like the sultans of old, who arbitrated among the tribes and manipulated them to gain support, he saw his role as that of moderator or arbiter⁹ among contending forces; and he worked to prevent any group from becoming strong enough to exercise power in its own right. At the same time, he attempted to remain aloof from politics and to act as a spiritual patriarch rather than as a directing force. He was an admired king but not a strong one.

The monarchy, in the end, won the levers of power almost by default. Two occurrences over which Mohammed himself had little control were decisive. First, the Istiqlal failed to establish dominance over the army. The stage was set when the Army of Liberation, which was largely a guerrilla force, denounced the party's appeal to join the French-trained

⁸This account of local politics is drawn in part from a biography of one of the Soussi merchants: John Waterbury's *North for the Trade*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972.

⁹Hassan also refers to himself as an arbiter (see *Le Maroc en Marche*, The Ministry of Information, Rabat, 1965, p. 206), and the word is much used to describe the role of Moroccan monarchs.

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officers in a national army. Later the guerrilla groups responded to the King, and for some years the army was under the dual leadership of an Istiqlal Minister of Defense and Hassan, then a young prince, as Chief of Staff. Not until the Rif rebellion in 1958-59—when Hassan led the army in putting down tribal insurrection and protest—did he take actual control, and the Istiqlal, then weakened by internal divisions, surrendered the Defense Ministry.

The second event which gave the King his power was the schism in the Istiqlal. Although he had abetted factionalism, the party basically broke of its own weight. The younger, more forward-looking members opposed the conservative orientation of their elders and they formed the National Union of Popular Forces in 1959. Thereafter the King did not have to bargain with a strong party. He held the right to appoint and dismiss his ministers, who were responsible solely to him.

Hassan has retained this right throughout most of his reign. For a brief period after 1961, however, when he came to the throne—without the prestige of his father—he allowed the politicians increased leverage, acquiescing in their demands for a constitution and a parliament. Elections were held in 1963, but no single party won a majority and the assembly bogged down in ineffectual debates. It was disbanded by Hassan, in the wake of serious riots in Casablanca in 1965, on charges that it paralyzed government action.

The second elections Hassan permitted were in 1970. They were aimed at providing a facade of parliamentary rule and at demonstrating that he had matters well in hand. Candidates were not allowed to run under party labels, and most of the parties boycotted the election. The rubber-stamp assembly of independents that resulted was dissolved after the 1971 coup attempt.

For most of the time, Hassan has thus ruled alone. And he has emphasized and refined the divide-and-rule technique of his father, allowing groups overtly opposed to him to continue to exist and consulting with them on occasion. He has not allowed any of them to become a directing force, or even any single person to dominate, say, economic affairs. Instead, he has weakened all who sought such authority. At the same time he has not sought to be a reformer himself.

b. Hassan's Leadership Style

Hassan is a unique combination of the traditional and the modern monarch. His household is shrouded in mystery, and his wives are not seen by Westerners. He dons a white *jellaba* and rides a white horse to religious observances,¹⁰ and he moves his court to his numerous palaces throughout the country in an aura of privilege and majesty perhaps expected by the mass of his countrymen, whose religious leader he is. He is also a graduate of Bordeaux University. He confers with politicians and labor leaders. He holds press conferences and fends reporters' questions in the Western manner. And he is a golf enthusiast, although his devotion to the game has diminished (or at least has been less publicized) since the attempts on his life in 1971 and 1972 inclined him to pay more attention to "the business of kingship."

His major accomplishments have been in the ancient art of statecraft. While actually close to the West, and benefitting from its aid, he preserved the nominal non-alignment of his country between East and West, and he worked successfully to improve its standing in the Arab world when events behooved him to do so. He has found the tackling of domestic problems less congenial than his traditional role as guardian of the national integrity; and on these issues he has procrastinated, arbitrating among the interests of both traditional and new elite groups, the politicians, urban labor, and the army. Basically his rule combines manipulation, cajolery, and force.

The techniques of manipulation, of divide-and-rule, that Hassan employs are dictated not by necessity but by choice, for he could be tougher if he wanted to be. The security forces under Col. Ahmed Dlimi are efficient, and they demonstrated their competency most recently in protecting visiting dignitaries during the October 1974 Arab summit meeting in Rabat. Hassan's style of leadership is, in part, adherence to the old modes of behavior which perhaps come naturally to a Moroccan king, but there are practical reasons behind it as well. Certain aspects of the manipulation technique, such as consultation with political parties, Hassan has found

¹⁰Since the 1971-72 attempts on his life, he has not appeared publicly on horseback, presumably for security reasons.

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useful in attempts to promote his image as an enlightened young monarch, worthy in particular of US aid. Finally, his dealings with some groups overtly opposed to him—such as the *Union Marocaine du Travail* (UMT), the most important labor union in the country—have served the cause of maintaining stability.

The UMT and some of the parties are probably useful in restraining or tempering the demands other groups in the society might make on the King. In the mid-1960's when the UMT was stronger than it is now Hassan may even have seen it as a counterpoise to the army. Today its critical press, joined with that of the UNFP and other liberal parties, undoubtedly reminds such entrepreneurial organizations as the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the other pressure groups in the society which must be mollified.

Press criticism is sometimes focused on the King. (The *Istiqlal* papers, for example, told Hassan the 1971-72 coup attempts were his own fault.) Such opposition, however, may serve Hassan well; it is, in a sense, a harmless outlet for voicing discontent which might otherwise be concentrated on overthrowing him. The criticism is, in any case, circumscribed. Opposition groups know the limits of the King's tolerance, and when they overstep it their papers are confiscated and their organizations suppressed.

The repressive measures of the regime, however, are sporadic. UNFP stalwarts are imprisoned, then released, and allowed to resume their previous political roles. Student demonstrations are broken up, but their extremist, anti-monarchical union was only periodically banned before 1972, and demands are being voiced for the lifting of the current proscription. Injustices, such as preventive detention, are well publicized, and Moroccans do not keep silent for fear of reprisals. Hassan plainly wants to keep his opponents weak, but he does not want to eliminate them. He thus gave the parties an opportunity to hold congresses and strengthen their organizations in 1974, when he made overtures to them about their participation in government. The apparent aim is to entice them into a coalition Cabinet which would prepare for elections, to be held on his terms.

Individually, a number of important party leaders have held Cabinet posts at various times since 1965, when parliament was disbanded; but they have had only the authority the King chose to give them and they have acted without party ties. Individuals without political affiliation, drawn mainly from the

elite, constitute Hassan's favorite clientele and his immediate entourage.

Often the King rewards his supporters by naming them to posts in government, many of which continue to be direct or indirect sources of profit in the form of concessions, licenses, authorization, etc. Some of these appointments are to the Cabinet, and because it has been used in this way its members have not played an effective directing role.

Hassan has not permitted consolidation of control on the part of his ministers, or even the routinization of ministerial functions. Thus the frequency and apparently capricious nature of his Cabinet reshuffles have become legend. Of the approximately 230 Cabinet appointments made since independence,¹¹ almost half have lasted only about a year and many for six months or under (see chart). Only those responsible for the King's safety, such as Maj. Gen. Mohammed Oufkir, the long-time Interior Minister and then Defense Minister who turned traitor in 1972, and those holding portfolios of lesser concern, such as Public Health, have been permitted long tenure in their posts. Changes have been most frequent in the ministries dealing with economic affairs, and undoubtedly the King has used them as an important part of what John Waterbury calls his "patronage system,"¹² i.e., showing royal favor and manipulating access to various kinds of prebends and kick-backs.¹³

¹¹The number cannot be precisely designated because of the changing composition of the portfolios and uncertainty as to whether some appointments are Cabinet level.

¹²Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful*, p. 150.


¹³Much has been said about corruption in Morocco, with the implication that all would be well (or at least much better) if the King would take stringent measures to eliminate it. Certainly it exists from the lowest level, where almost any kind of document issued by local authorities is likely to require a fee, to the highest, where such benefits as those accruing to Ministry of Finance officials from their processing of government claims for overtime are notorious. Yet political scientists have come to question the deleterious effects of corruption, particularly in developing societies. Some, in fact, have argued that corruption promotes national integration, capital formation, and administrative efficiency. (See Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VII, November 1964, and J. S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, LXI, June 1967.) No such case can be made for Morocco. Yet at the same time, evidence is not sufficient to permit the judgment that corruption has been a hindrance to development efforts. Suffice it to say that, despite harsher measures taken by Hassan in 1974, corruption remains a problem, probably increasing the cynicism of the populace toward King and government.

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DURATION OF CABINET APPOINTMENTS, 1957-74

(Approximately 230 appointments made to Cabinet)



Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

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As it naturally behooves the King to bestow his favor rather widely, his Cabinet reshuffles—and other appointments too—have come to resemble a game of musical chairs, with some members of the government moving from post to post, then perhaps dropped for years, and rehabilitated in another go-round. Few of the prominent men disappear completely from the ranks of Moroccan officialdom, for put-downs are seldom permanent. Bachir Bel Abbes Tnarji, for example, who was named Minister of Justice in a 1973 Cabinet, had held no official post since the early 1960's, when he had served as Minister of Labor. Sometimes the Rabat rumor mill tries to supply a reason for a temporary eclipse. Thus Driss Slaoui left the government following the 1971 coup attempt, after a decade of Cabinet-level posts, amid rumors that he had been either implicated in or offended by the corruption cases that had been disclosed in connection with the coup. In 1974 he was rehabilitated and named permanent representative to the United Nations.

A place in the Cabinet is probably best assured by marrying into the royal family, for both Prime Minister Ahmed Osman and former Foreign Minister Mohammed Cherkaoui are married to Hassan's sisters. But ties to the moneyed families are also helpful: the wife of the present Foreign Minister, Ahmed Laraki, is Badia Sebti, whose family made a fortune in Casablanca real estate, and his predecessor in the job,

Ahmed Talbi Benhima, is married to the daughter of Morocco's wealthiest businessman and financier, Mohammed Laghzaoui.

Rivalries and the jostling for position often pit family against family in the royal court, and intrigue and rumors abound. As the King is influenced by his gossip, the atmosphere is often such that efficient functioning at the top-level of the bureaucracy is simply smothered. The dismissal of Prime Minister Muhammed Benhima in 1969 took place under such conditions. Rumors to the effect that he had pocketed money on public works contracts were circulated by, among others, Ali Benjelloun, who thought that Benhima had been instrumental in his losing the Justice Ministry post. A relative of Benjelloun was at that time the Director General of the Royal Cabinet, who controls access to the King. As a result, Benhima was for months cut off from contact with Hassan and thus lost his capacity to act long before his final ouster.

Disputes or disagreements in the Cabinet center on competition for the King's favor or attention and rarely have ideological content. No minister has been known to argue policy with the King or to say no to him. Decisions emanate from Hassan, and if any of his associates figure in the process of making them, they have not been identified. Those closest to him over the years have been his security men: first, Maj. Gen. Mohammed Oufkir, until he turned against the King in 1972; and now Col. Ahmed Dlimi, who has succeeded, in large measure, to Oufkir's role but not to his ministerial posts. The degree of influence or authority they have had, however, is questionable. The King maneuvers to offset anyone in his entourage who he thinks is gaining too much power, and there is some suspicion he may have been acting to moderate Oufkir's authority—thus perhaps prompting the coup attempt.

Hassan is unwilling to share power, and the result is drift and indecision at the top unless he feels obliged to act. His personal inclinations and the demands on his time thus figure in the situation. In fact, the criticism made of him by the long-time opposition leader now in exile, Mohammed Basri, has some truth in it.

He excels in analyzing personalities. This prevents him from being thoroughly familiar with objective conditions and from producing sound and sincere solutions to problems.¹⁰

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"Hume Afrique" Euro 21 February 1975, JPRS translation

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3. Contenders for Power and Status

The task of the King in winning and holding political control has been simplified by the nature of the groups operating in Moroccan society: some have limited aims, and those ambitions for real power reveal inherent flaws at crucial times. These characteristics are apparent in each of the following:

a. The Elite

The King is the patron and the protector of the elite. Landlords, merchants, and businessmen look to him to protect them from expropriation, nationalization, and land reform, and he does so. Although taxation in Morocco has become increasingly progressive, no inheritance tax has been instituted; and so far only foreign-owned estates have been taken over for distribution to poor farmers. This is not to say that great fortunes, in the Western sense, have been amassed, but only that the interests of the fairly well-to-do have been looked after.

In part because of this protection, the elite is still basically drawn from among those who had money and education at the time of independence. Families who were prominent then and in pre-colonial days—such as the Benjellouns, the Bahinis, the Boutalebs, the Ouazzanis, and the Debbaghs—continue to play important roles, with their members represented in all facets of official and commercial life.¹⁵ Entry into the elite is not and never has been closed, however, and its numbers are growing as appointments are increasingly made on the basis of competence instead of family connection and as opportunities for making money are opening up.

According to an estimate made by John Waterbury,¹⁶ the elite in the decade after independence numbered only about 1,000 men: 100 army officers; 750 high-ranking government officials and rural notables and administrators; 130 prominent politicians and union leaders; and 100 others, including businessmen and religious dignitaries (the *ulama*).¹⁷ In the past 10

¹⁵ The French began to keep records of important families at about the turn of the century. See Andre Adam, *Casablanca: Essai sur la transformation de la société Marocaine au contact de l'Occident*, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1968.

¹⁶ *The Commander of the Faithful*, p. 86.

¹⁷ The religious groups constitute the weakest element of the elite. They continue to be cultivated by the royal family, however, in order to strengthen popular support.

years, the elite has probably doubled in size, as it has come to include far more entrepreneurs, working either in private business or in the government-controlled sector of the economy, and also prominent educators and journalists.

The elite thus includes the King's main constituency and also the main opposition to him.¹⁸ Both groups are affected by Hassan's manipulative techniques, for those outside the immediate government circle are as vulnerable as the Cabinet ministers to royal put-downs and rehabilitations. Ahmad Benkirane, a Casablanca businessman and director of the pro-UNFP paper *Maroc-Informations* in the mid-1960's, was without an influential position for several years after his newspaper was suspended; but then he was suddenly named to a post in the government-controlled sector of the economy. Often these rehabilitations are connected with the King's political concerns of the moment. In late 1974 he was interested in reviving the UNFP as part of the restoration of political life, and a number of the party's stalwarts, who had been arrested on charges of anti-government plotting, were released from prison. They included Omar Benjelloun, an old-time UNFP revolutionary and former editor of the party's newspaper.

Economic reprisals are another means by which the King makes his power felt. Government contracts can be directed away from offending businessmen, and personal favors can be revoked. For example, villas used by the Moroccan elder statesman and former Prime Minister Ahmed Bakhfaj were taken over by the government in 1972 after his son Anis, a young engineer, had been charged with (and was later sentenced for) alleged involvement in revolutionary schemes.¹⁹ Granting the right to use property or land is one way the King shows his pleasure, but often the grant is temporary and it may be withdrawn for no apparent reason. When that happens the erstwhile recipient has no recourse, for he himself has participated in the spoils system.

These ups-and-downs in Moroccan society are certainly sufficient to give rise to personal insecurity. They may lead as well to what Waterbury calls "alliance-building" among the elite²⁰—a tendency to

¹⁸ One study (Frank Braun, *The Role of the Intelligentsia in Modernization: The Case of Morocco*, University of Texas Ph. D. dissertation, 1971) estimates the "opposition elite," which bargains for privileges within the government system, at about 160 members.

¹⁹ CS-311, 03797, 27 July 1972.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

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hedge bets by forming connections with various business interests and ties with members of government so that the damage is lessened if one's personal fortunes decline.

Intermarriage is one way of building these alliances and of promoting one's interests, and it is a method much employed in Morocco. Family ties often extend throughout the official and commercial communities, as illustrated by the connections of Ahmed Balafout, the prominent government official and father of the young "revolutionary." He was raised by an uncle, Mohammed Gnesson, whose family business interests include a large pharmaceutical concern and whose son has served as Minister of Finance. Balafout married into the Hennant family, whose members have held such positions as Director of the Moroccan Navigation Company and Vice Governor of the Bank of Morocco and also have served as ambassadors, and his daughter married Muhammad Douiri, whose posts have included the Finance Ministry.

Often family ties cross partisan lines. Thus an important official of the UMT, Abdelkrim Ben Sliman, is the nephew of the head of the palace-supported Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement, Abdelkrim Khatibi, and the brother-in-law of M'Hamed Boucetta, who heads the Istiqlal.

It is difficult to gauge the effects on the country of such inter-relationships, which are normal in Morocco not per se but rather because of their extent and complexity. They are striking largely because the elite is small in size, and many of its members know one another. Throughout the upper levels of the society, personal associations seem to smooth the edges of political differences and blur the sense of ideological commitment, perhaps promoting a tendency to acquiesce in the status quo. If this is the case, it may be a factor in the reluctance to strike out on new paths, to press for tough decisions on such matters as land reform, and to devise means to effect a more equitable distribution of income—in short, to pursue development goals.

b. The Military

Army and air force elements have tried twice to bring down Hassan and take control. In July 1971 a group of high-ranking officers led 1,500 cadets of the noncommissioned officers' school in an attack on the palace at Skhirat, where the King, his senior advisers, and the diplomatic corps were celebrating his

birthday. Just 14 months later, air force pilots tried to shoot down the fleeing 727 that was bringing the King home from France. All evidence indicated that the King's trusted security man, Maj. Gen. Mohammed Oufkir, was behind this attempted regicide.

The specific motives of the rebels—or the directions in which they would have sought to move the country, had they succeeded—will never be known. The officers involved in the earlier unsuccessful coup either were among the some 100 persons killed during the storming of the palace or were executed soon thereafter. Oufkir was officially reported to have committed suicide but it is more likely that he was summarily executed on the King's orders.

The extraordinary ineptness of both coup attempts does not necessarily imply anything about the potential of the officers in mounting the country (though it may be indicative). More significant is the fact that they did not have a base of power in the society or such an advantage as here status. Moroccan officialdom, labor leaders, politicians, and businessmen reportedly reacted to the coup attempts with fear and trepidation, although the coup leaders were themselves members of the elite. (One of them, Gen. Amalzen Hammou, was in fact related to Hassan's principal wife.) And, as Hassan indicated after the 1971 attempt, in pointing out the past favors he had granted the traitors, they had participated in the spoils system.

Linkages and overlap between the political elite and the officer corps of almost 2,000 (which commands the approximately 60,000-man armed forces) are significant. One of the highest ranking officers, Brig. Gen. Abdelkham Sefjoui, who was named Inspector of Infantry in 1975 and who headed the contingent which fought in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, is related, through the marriage of his sister, to the influential family of Thami Ouazzani, a prominent lawyer who has been associated with several political parties and held a number of Cabinet posts, and also to Hamid Skali, an important entrepreneur and hotel owner in Tangier. Through Sefjoui's own marriage into the Bouzellham family, he is related to Messaoud Chiguer, a former Cabinet minister who was among the early Istiqlal leaders.

The most important single man in the military—and perhaps, with the exception of the King, in the country—is the security chief, Colonel Dlimi. His career presents an intelligent young man on the make—and one who has been amazingly successful in

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establishing a close association with Hassan and also ties to the elite. Dlimi married the sister of General Sefiou's wife and thus moves in high political and commercial circles. In addition, his real estate dealings have brought him close to the Tazi family, important in textile manufacturing and other businesses.²¹

Now in his mid-40's, Dlimi has divided his career between the army and police duties, but his meteoric rise was in the latter and may well have been connected with his offering himself up in 1966 as a scapegoat in the Paris trial for the kidnapping and murder of the Moroccan opposition leader, Mehdi Ben Barka.²² By 1970 he was apparently whittling away at the authority of his boss, General Oufkir, for he was named to head the *Service National*, which was removed from the jurisdiction of Oufkir's Ministry of Interior.²³ When Oufkir fell, Dlimi soon began to take his place in the King's favor.

Together with the security services, the military is re-emerging as the instrument and the support of the palace, following a lapse after 1971-72 coup attempts. At that time Hassan castigated the army, broke its units up, and stripped them of their ammunition, lest they plot again on his life. Yet he seems to be once more the patron of the military. He is personally responsible for the modernization program and is seeking the equipment his officers want, despite the danger to himself inherent in the build-up of the armed forces.

In the meantime, the composition of the army continues to change. It is no longer the predominantly Berber force created by the French. Standards at the Dar el Beida Academy in Meknes have been raised, with the result of favoring the better educated urban and Arab youths. Ties with the elite are undoubtedly weakening, moreover, for the sons of the prestigious families seem to be more attracted to government and business than to the military.

The formative experiences of the younger officers differ from those of their elders. Many of the latter grew up during the independence struggle. The former were youths during the 1960's and remember the

²¹PIREH, 312, 01900, 14 May 1974.

²²In this famous trial the French charged General Oufkir, Hassan refused to extradite him, and Moroccan-French relations deteriorated as a result. Dlimi, who was wanted for complicity, was sent to stand trial and was subsequently acquitted.

²³Dlimi's rising fortunes may have been a factor in turning Oufkir against the King.

political dissent of that time. The lieutenants and the captains were in secondary school in 1965, when protest demonstrations by students and workers resulted in several hundred dead and led to the dissolution of parliament. Little information is available now on the political attitudes of the military, but many of its younger members may well share the dissatisfaction of the opposition politicians and impatience with the slow pace of change in the country.

A coup is always possible in Morocco but, if it happens, it does not necessarily mean new direction for the country. Two basic factors throw doubt upon the army's ability to play the developmental role better than Hassan or with the success military regimes have had in some countries. The first is the practice, common in many developing countries, of drawing on the military to staff the security services. The second is the past association of the officer corps with the French. Upon independence, the Moroccan army incorporated some resistance fighters, but most of its officers had received their training, rank, and battle experience under the French flag, having served mainly in Indochina. Some of them, such as General Sefiou, are still on active duty. While many have retired, the after-effects of their orientation almost surely linger on.

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Characteristics of professionalism and conservatism inherited from the French military must account for the disinterest in leftist causes and contempt for political methods reported to run through the officer corps. This corps, in turn, lacks the prestige of leadership in the independence struggle, and its image has not been improved by the army's more recent association with the repressive measures of Hassan's government. Any political-military alliance formed in the aftermath of a coup is thus unlikely, and without it an army-based regime would almost surely be more repressive than the present one and probably no more successful in providing direction for the country.

c. The Political Parties

The word "party" is, in a sense, inappropriate for the nation's political organizations because the *raison d'être* of parties in most countries is to compete for power through elections, and those in Morocco have had no meaningful chance to do so for 12 years. Yet

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the parties there are organized, a number have clearly defined bases of support, and they do exert considerable influence. The main channel for this influence is the newspapers which a number of the parties control and which—within understood parameters of limited opposition—criticize official actions and report on matters embarrassing to the regime. The political organizations thus have some strengths entitling them to be considered parties. They are, unfortunately, as divided as ever.

In Moroccan politics, the pluralism of the society thus comes to the fore. For at least a time after independence there was an outside chance that a responsible multiparty system might emerge, but it was lost in the record of party infighting and splits, which have been variously based on doctrinal differences, generational conflicts, regional allegiances, and personal rivalries. And conversely, unions have been formed and fronts established by the most divergent of groups (see chart). As Clement Moore puts it in his astute comparison of political developments in the North African countries:

In Morocco a variety of organizations penetrated society just as a variety of traditional structures penetrated the political system. Groups tended more to reflect elite divisions than to express the demands of the constituencies—reflecting the segmentary social structures, they combined and divided in light of the short-term tactical calculations of their leaders. Underlying family structures facilitated alliances and tempered loyalties to any given group.²¹

After 32 years of existence, the Istiqlal is still probably the strongest party, but this endurance is misleading to the extent that it gives an aura of stability to Moroccan politics. The party has retained dominance largely through the magic of its dogmatic name (which means independence) and nostalgia for the camaraderie of the independence struggle. The waning force of such appeals is evident in the decline of membership from over a million in 1963 to an estimated 200,000. Essentially the party is an elitist grouping rather than an organization seriously addressing the country's problems. While calling for a constitutional monarchy, and criticizing Hassan for not taking more forceful action for social betterment, the

party is more comfortable when it addresses religious and nationalist causes, such as the continuance of Koranic schools and the recovery of the Spanish Sahara. Its traditionalist bent is apparent in its opposition to Morocco's family planning program and its campaign for the primacy of the Arabic language, i.e., its criticism of the present bilingual system which uses French and Arabic in public administration and in education.

Able men are among the Istiqlal leaders, and given an opportunity to participate in government they might well develop a more credible program. Yet the party is in danger of division. The long time leader and national hero Allal al-Fassi died in 1974 and was succeeded by the more practical and progressive Mohammed Boucetta. Any attempts he might make to transform the Istiqlal into something resembling a mass party would doubtless widen the already serious generation gap within its leadership.

The political leaders of the future have not emerged in Morocco. Boucetta at 50 represents the younger element of the Istiqlal, although he has been in the Executive Committee since the early 1960's. The composition of this committee was virtually unchanged at the 1975 congress of the party (the first since 1967), but a number of new men were named to the lower ranking Central Committee. In the other major parties, the leaders have been on the scene since independence and are in their mid to late fifties.


The U.N.F.P. which developed from a split in the Istiqlal in 1959, is the closest thing to a real party that Morocco has had. Its initial program calling for a genuinely democratic government, a controlled economy, and state welfare has been little altered, but the party has been harassed by the regime and greatly weakened. Moreover, it broke into two parties in 1974, with the Babat faction forming the Socialist Union of Popular Forces. This split separates the party's theoreticians and intellectuals from their labor support, which remains with the old U.N.F.P., now centered in Casablanca and backed by the U.N.F.P. leader Mahjoub Ben Seddik.

Other, less important parties retain some following. The Popular Movement, originally a Berber-based grouping encouraged by the King to counter the predominantly Fassi Istiqlal, is now divided into two groups, both of them eventually conservative. On the left, the Communists are again meeting, after a period of proscription. Never of significance in Morocco, in

²¹ *Politics in North Africa*, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1970, p. 207.

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POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENTS



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part because the UNFP drew off potential supporters, they are perhaps hoping to fare better under the new name Party of Progress and Socialism. And in the meantime new parties, such as the Liberal Progressive Party organized by Casablanca businessmen, proliferate. One of them, the Rif-based Action Party, which appeared to offer the potential of bringing rural groups into politics, is already rent by dissension among its founders.

None of the parties, for over a decade, has been able to mobilize sufficient support to back up the demands it makes on the King. They have only the power Hassan chooses to give them, but they remain hopeful still of a meaningful role. While reluctant to perpetuate the status quo, they responded to the overtures he began to make to them in 1974 about participation in the government, and they are willing to open a dialogue with him, apparently on the grounds that they have nothing to lose. On the issue of reviving the claim to the Spanish Sahara, which the King is using in part to heal divisions, the parties have rallied around him, and their leaders undertook missions to explain the Moroccan position to foreign governments.

The extent of the parties' popular appeal is questionable. Some of them, including the UNFP, welcomed Hassan's decision to postpone parliamentary elections beyond 1975 because it will allow them time to build up their strength. Party organizations in the countryside are vestigial or non-existent, and urban membership has fallen during the years without elections.

In view of their past experience, many politically aware Moroccans are probably skeptical of the vaguely socialist goals that most of the parties proclaim, and they probably doubt that repartition of the national wealth or similar moves would benefit them directly. The programs of the parties are not specific, offering no strategies for the betterment of Morocco. Although in the long term the performance of the politicians might improve, especially as the generation gap in the parties narrows in the next 10 to 15 years, at this stage the parties do not have the capacity to act as a catalyst for popular discontent or as a viable force for progressive change. They are fighting defensively against a strong regime and also among themselves.

d. Labor

The largest and most important trade union in Morocco, the UMT, has not sought a directing role. Its

long-time leader, Mahjoub Ben Seddik, is closely tied to the UNFP, and union members probably constitute the backbone of that party, but the UMT is not formally affiliated with it. While Ben Seddik talks a radical political line and is prominent in international labor affairs, he has, for the most part, confined UMT actions to those that bring direct benefits to the workers.

Unlike labor unions in most developing countries, which are ancillary instruments of control under the authorities, the UMT exists as a separate entity with a base in urban labor. It has, with partial exceptions, resisted subordination to governmental authority and preserved its organizational integrity. It has also accepted a limited role and concentrated its activity on "bread-and-butter" trade unionism. For this reason, it has been successful as a union. Even though UMT strength has dwindled, largely because of unemployment, to about half the 600,000 members it claimed in the mid-1960's, the union has and uses the right to strike, having organized an average of 80 strikes or walk-outs a year between 1970 and 1973, with an annual loss of roughly 80,000 work-days. Throughout the past decade, the union has won for its members benefits disproportionate to the general economic situation. Sometimes it has blocked such measures as cuts in the work-week, which might have helped the government to share jobs and ease the unemployment situation.

Why does Hassan permit the continued existence of a disciplined power group that is not under his control? The answer lies in the fact that the UMT is essentially middle class. Union members, for the most part, have steady jobs and see themselves far better off than many around them. They thus share the King's interest in maintaining stability. Moreover, the UMT's local affiliates have probably experienced the tough actions taken by provincial governors—many of whom were in the past seconded from the army—against labor militants, and the union as a whole sees reason to fear a military takeover of the government.

Hassan's regime harasses the UMT and punishes its sometimes overly zealous criticism of him. (Ben Seddik was imprisoned most recently for anti-government speeches made during the disturbances after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, but there was some suspicion then that the regime had taken action to help him refurbish his revolutionary image and improve his standing with the more militant factions of his union.) For the most part, however, the UMT manages not to offend the

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King, perhaps as a result of the negotiations Ben Seddik has in the past conducted with him, both personally and through intermediaries. The operations of the union are thus circumscribed: it avoids association with student disorders and its strikes rarely have political overtones. In short, the UMT knows the limits of its power, and it knows that efforts to acquire more would be met with force.

B. Indecision on Key Issues

The existence of the various power blocs and/or pressure groups in Moroccan society has deterred the kind of decisive action that would have meant overriding established interests and tightening government authority. Hassan, with his propensity for arbitrating among contending forces, has attempted to appease them when convenient to do so; and he has been disinclined by temperament to make hard decisions on developmental matters. The result has been a vacillating approach to domestic problems and an emphasis on the public relations aspects of issues and projects. These characteristics have been apparent in the government's economic planning and in its approach to education.

1. Economic Planning

The fundamental defects in Morocco's early development efforts were best defined by a survey team of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1964-66.²⁵ While recognizing that the decline in the economy²⁶ during the first decade of independence reflected the departure of large numbers of French settlers and the resultant outflow of capital, the mission stressed as an important contributing factor the faulty planning machinery that had been established. This machinery, the mission found, was cumbersome with regard to decision-making and virtually nonexistent for purposes of implementation.

Morocco's planning mechanism was devised soon after independence by the politicians then serving in the government. It was the Superior Planning Council,

composed of all the members of a large Cabinet and nine other representatives; three speaking for agriculture and selected by the Union of Moroccan Agriculture, which is essentially a pressure group of the big landowners; three for labor, named by the UMT; and three for business, selected by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

The design of this council was aimed largely at planting diverse views and interests. Its deliberations resulted in the 1960-64 plan, which divided its emphasis between agriculture and industry and tried to give something to everyone. The high level of public investment that it called for (14 percent of the gross domestic product), while never fully achieved, was sufficient to bring on inflation, balance of payments deficits, and declining foreign exchange reserves. The economy was growing at a rate of under 3 percent a year instead of the projected 6 percent, and the plan was simply abandoned about 1963.

By the mid-1960's Hassan had succeeded in undercutting the authority of the politicians, and responsibility for economic planning fell more directly on him. He did not improve the planning mechanism. Instead of sharpening the focus of the council which had drawn up the 1960-64 plan, he increased its size. He renamed it the Superior Council for National Development and Planning, and he included in its membership the governors and other officials of the 19 provinces and the 2 prefectures into which the country was then divided. Planning efforts, still little more than vague suggestions for public investment, reflected the King's preoccupation with political objectives. Aid to small farmers was sacrificed to more impressive projects, such as dam construction, which were usually announced with considerable fanfare. Most of the dams, moreover, were in areas where they benefitted the already relatively prosperous modern sector of agriculture and the influential landowners.

As the 1965-67 plan was allegedly prepared under the personal direction of the King, members of the Superior Council may well have feared that fundamental criticism would be considered an affront. Goals were again unrealistic, although spending had been reduced to conserve remaining foreign exchange, and a drought had further lowered the rate of economic growth. This plan fared no better than the earlier effort, and the greatest lags were in the priority sectors, with spending on agriculture amounting to only two-thirds of the planned investment.

²⁵The *Economic Development of Morocco*, published for IBRD by the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., 1966.

²⁶In the first decade of independence, Morocco's national output grew by an annual average of only 1.6 percent and thus declined on a per capita basis.

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In none of these efforts was any kind of a coordinating or supervisory authority empowered to oversee plan fulfillment.²⁷ Some agencies, such as the Division for Economic Coordination, were established but not used, and provincial governors complained on occasion that they had not been informed of projects that were underway in their areas.²⁸ IBRD, at one point, threatened to suspend its assistance because of the Moroccans' poor administration.²⁹

Foreign aid did little to dispel the economic stagnation. In the early and mid-1960's Morocco was receiving roughly \$150 million a year from over 20 countries and several international agencies. These resources, however, were dissipated in a multitude of projects, many of which had only token effect. Donor nations complained that they were given no clear-cut plan of priorities or requirements.³⁰ Although the economy, with its emphasis on the impressive, long-gestation projects, was gradually providing the means for future improvement, indecision and lack of direction continued to characterize its management until the late 1960's.

2. The Language of Education

Similar indecisiveness is apparent in Morocco's failure to define the aims of national education. The dispute, when the nation won its independence, centered on the Arabization of the educational system,

²⁷The comparisons often made between Tunisia and Morocco, to the detriment of the latter, are instructive in connection with economic planning. Bourguiba too had problems of overcoming vested interests when he came to power. He did not begin to emphasize economic planning until he had established the control of the Neo-Destour Party (now the Destourian Socialist Party) throughout the country, replacing locally elected officials with centrally appointed ones. The party, working through such means as its agricultural and commercial cooperatives, then implemented the changes sought by the planners. The government thus came to dominate most aspects of the economy, and Ahmed Ben Salah was a virtual economic czar. (See Douglas Ashford, *Morocco—Tunisia: Politics and Planning*, Syracuse University Press, N.Y., 1965.) Time, however, has not been kind to these comparisons. Despite early successes in achieving its goals, the Tunisian system has not proved more efficacious than the more haphazard Moroccan approach. Dissension in the Tunisian countryside and declining agricultural output led to abandonment of collectivization policies and decentralization of control. The 1969-72 plan was abandoned, and Ben Salah is in exile in Paris.

²⁸Ashford, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

²⁹INR, Research Memorandum RAF-18, 8 August 1968.

³⁰Rabat, A-06, 22 January 1971.

and it pitted those who wanted education to promote the traditional culture against those who wanted priority given to social reform and therefore urged technical education and a flexible approach to the language issue. The former, urging instant Arabization of the curricula, tended to slight reality: the system Morocco had inherited upon independence was almost entirely French, and teachers and textbooks in Arabic were few in number. The opponents of Arabization favored working toward a bilingual system and maintained that practical possibilities must determine doctrine.

Two national conferences were held on education, one in 1964 and one in 1970, attended by educators, members of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and regional representatives. The 1964 conference rejected the principle of bilingualism. A more vacillating approach was taken in the 1970 meeting, which gave greater weight to the problems inherent in Arabization.

The King catered to various interests on the matter. Despite the decision of the 1964 conference, he appointed Mohammed Benhima as Education Minister and supported him in the retention of French as the primary teaching language. In 1967, however, in an apparent overture to the traditionalist old-guard of the Istiqlal, Benhima was replaced by Abdelhadi Boutaleb, a graduate of the Islamie Qurawiyin University and a proponent of rapid Arabization. For a while, it was a formal requirement that all primary instruction be in Arabic, despite the fact that most secondary school subjects were taught in French.

In practice, Arabic was taught where there were teachers and books and ignored where programs could not be changed. Given no clear mandate, the professional educators attempted to show progress toward Arabization to satisfy political demands. At the same time, they tried to avoid interference from public groups, continued to employ French teachers because qualified Moroccans were very few in number, and worked toward the retention of French in secondary schools.

A workable system has gradually evolved. Arabic is taught in the first several years of primary school, French is then introduced as a subject, and on the secondary level students are given the choice of a monolingual (Arabic or French) or a bilingual program. The system, in fact, is similar to one Tunisia adopted in the late 1950's and Morocco denounced at

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the time as a denial of the Arab heritage. Arabization of the entire system remains the official goal, but it is a very distant one. Bilingualism is encouraged throughout the school system, and government publications point with pride to the increasing numbers of bilingual students.³¹

III. THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

The disinclination or inability of other institutions and forces in the society to guide development efforts produced a vacuum which is gradually being filled by the bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, by the business community. The actions of both groups are having the effect of propelling the nation along the path of change. As they are essentially task-oriented, the first result of their efforts is increased efficiency in the administration of the country, but social repercussions are becoming evident.

Two factors underlie this development. First, such matters as the language of education have been slowly dropping from the arena of public debate, and the elaboration and implementation of various policies and projects have been increasingly left to the specialists concerned with them. Second, these specialists work not as individuals but rather as cogs of organizations or institutions. As such, they are winning the confidence of the King. For example, the civil servants who drew up the 1971-77 development plan and gave form and meaning to Hassan's vague suggestions concerning the public good pose no competition to him and no challenge to his style of leadership, and he accordingly endorses their proposals.

The prerequisite for the course the bureaucrats and the entrepreneurs have been pursuing has been the evolution of an educational system responsive to the needs of the nation and of a corps of trained and experienced personnel. Deficiencies in both education and experience were great when Morocco became independent, and they are being overcome only gradually. Yet as the educational system improves and as competency increases throughout the society, other aspects of change are going forward. The Moroccan case thus illustrates the potency of education and its inter-relationship with other aspects and phases of the cumulative process of change.

³¹For example, *The Organization and Evolution of Modern Morocco*, The Ministry of Information, Rabat, 1973, p. 283, reports that the percentage of students receiving "bilingual diplomas" rose from 37 percent of the total in 1965 to 78 percent in 1971.

A. Education as an Object and Agent of Change

As an object of change, education has been treated haphazardly, i.e., it has not been consistently shaped in accord with a plan designed to meet national needs. At the time of independence, the goal of Arabization was combined with the aim of rapid expansion of the system. Based understandably on emotional and cultural concerns, these twin goals resulted in a considerable lowering of academic standards. They slighted the needs for trained manpower and ignored the lesson that national development correlates more closely with higher education than with the numbers educated.

Emphasis in educational programs did not begin to shift until the 1968-72 plan was formulated. That plan began the gradual diversion of resources away from primary education and toward the forms of more direct assistance in meeting manpower needs; e.g., secondary schooling and, in particular, vocational training. Even then the allocation for secondary schools was low and, in fact, did not reach 40 percent of the educational budget until 1973. The number of vocational programs, however, was increased at the end of the 1960's and scholarship preference was given to scientifically and technically specialized students. To formalize the "new look" in education the Ministry for Higher, Secondary, and Technical Education and Cadre Training was established in 1968.

Despite this slow evolution of a more practical educational doctrine, the Moroccan system's shortcomings are still manifold. It remains an uneasy mix of secular and religious, public and private, and Arab and French elements. About 12% of all primary students—and 28% of the 530,000 pupils in rural areas—in the 1971/72 school years were attending Koranic schools. Although these schools were placed under the Ministry of Education in 1968 and increased weight in the curriculum has been given to reading and writing, the emphasis continues to be on memorizing religious texts. The best schools are still the private ones, and they are attended by about 10% of all students. These pupils are, of course, from the families of the well-to-do, and the schools that they prefer are those operated by the French University and Cultural Mission (*Mission universitaire et culturelle française*—MUCF).

Most children in Morocco still do not attend school. Of the approximately 3.2 million between the ages of 8

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and 14, at the time of the last census in 1971, only 42% were in school. Of that total, slightly over 68% were boys and almost 70% lived in urban areas. The percentage of the 8-14 year-olds attending school rose to 44% in 1973/74, thus barely keeping up with the population increase.

The Moroccan school system provides for five years of primary education; one year of so-called secondary observation, which is devoted largely to intensive study of French; and six years of secondary school, divided into two three-year cycles. The first of these cycles provides general academic studies, and the second offers the option of continuing academic courses (Arabic or modern letters, experimental science, economics, and mathematics) or undertaking agricultural, industrial, commercial, or hotel training. Higher education is provided mainly by the Mohammed V University in Rabat, which has branches in Casablanca, Fes, Marrakech, and Tetouan, and whose total enrollment was just under 18,000 in 1972/73. Advanced studies are also pursued at the Islamic Qarawiyn University in Fes, where only about 800 students are enrolled, and at various specialized institutions.

The quality of Moroccan education remains poor. Many graduates of primary schools are little more than functionally literate (only about a third of them pass the examination required for continuance of their studies), and few of the secondary school students qualify for a diploma. The Upper Secondary School Certificate (referred to as the *baccalaureat*) has been awarded to somewhat fewer than 5,000 a year in the 1970's and the Technical Diploma to only about 1,000. Attrition rates at all levels are high. Shortage of instructors is a major obstacle to progress, and only an estimated 30% of those teaching have completed the regular three-year course at one of the teacher-training institutes. Many teachers circumvent the supposed requirements by working as assistants or trainees. In secondary education, where recent efforts have been made to upgrade the level of instruction, about half the teachers are foreign, most of them French.

Education is nonetheless having a significant impact on Moroccan society; it is an important agent of change. The reasons for this are threefold: great numbers have been educated; a stress on higher education has emerged; and an educated elite, still composed largely of those schooled abroad, has been increasing in numbers and slowly gaining authority in

many fields, including teaching and the administration of education.

In the monumental task of providing basic learning to a rapidly increasing population the Moroccan achievement in less than two decades of independence should not be underestimated. During their protectorate, the French had discouraged even the concept of mass education, and many of the Moroccans at that time saw schooling largely as a medium for perpetuating Islamic values. When the protectorate ended, only about 400,000 were attending schools of any kind, most of them religious. Some 300 to 400 went to school each year in France, but it has been reported that only 100 of those educated in Morocco held the *baccalaureat*. Against this background, Moroccan gains are impressive. By the 1960/61 school year, students numbered almost one million and roughly one-tenth of them were in secondary school. The literacy rate at that time had reached 17% of those over 5 years of age, and it had grown to 24% when the 1971 census was taken.

The momentum in primary education began to slow about the mid-1960's, probably reflecting a public realization that a few years of schooling provided no panacea and a concomitant decline in parental desire to send their children to school. Subsequently, public expenditure on primary education declined as a proportion of the budget, and in the past decade enrollment in the lower schools has increased at an annual average rate of about 40,000 (see table), in contrast to yearly increases of over 100,000 in the late 1950's, i.e., from 230,000 in 1955 to 735,000 in 1960. As the expansion of primary schooling slowed, enrollment in secondary schools and in institutions of higher learning more than doubled, and the ratio of primary to secondary students has fallen from six to one to under four to one.

School Enrollment			Institutions of Higher Learning
School Year	Primary	Secondary	
1964/65	1,105,182	170,957	c.9000
1968/69	1,135,865	287,438	11,911
1969/70	1,142,810	293,193	12,770
1970/71	1,175,227	328,880	16,009
1971/72	1,231,936	313,414	17,025
1972/73	1,275,857	334,852	21,829
1973/74	1,337,931	361,636	na*

*Statistics not available.

Sources: *Annuaire Statistique du Maroc*, Direction de la Statistique, Rabat; *La Situation Economique du Maroc*, Secretariat d'Etat au Plan, Rabat; and the *Organization and Evolution of Modern Morocco*, op. cit.

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From the secondary school students, a core of trained manpower is slowly developing. Although students have proved reluctant to pursue the technical programs, efforts have been made to upgrade the courses and the number of students receiving some vocational training in secondary schools is now roughly 20% of total enrollment. Others subsequently receive training at such special schools as the Rabat Center for Professional Training, which offers instruction in industrial arts and office work and which requires for admission two or three years of secondary school. The growing numbers of these technically trained is evidence of a more practical approach to education, brought on by the serious unemployment among the unskilled and the concomitant demand for skilled workers. At higher levels of education too, scientific and other specialized studies are gaining on the old-time favorites of literature and law. At Mohammed V University enrollment in the faculties of science, medicine, and engineering tripled between 1967/68 and 1971/72, to reach 3,500 in the latter year, whereas the faculties of law, letters, and sociology did not quite double in size. Enrollment in those studies was nonetheless three times the number of those pursuing a scientific discipline, so that the predilections of students cannot be said to conform with the preferences of the authorities.

The third reason education is significant as an agent of change in Morocco stems, in a sense, from negative action on the part of the government: It did far less than most newly independent countries to curtail the influence of the former colonizer. In education the French imprint has meant that, while the quality of Moroccan schooling is poor, there is a small core of the truly well educated. These include the some 6,000 secondary school students who attend the French-operated MUCF institutions. Many of this group are then among the approximately 5,000 who go abroad each year for higher education.

Most of those who have studied abroad return home. Among Moroccan students, in contrast to those of many countries, no particular "brain-drain" is evident. The reason they return is presumably related to their social origin: most are from the well-to-do families and, though they may be critical of Hassan's regime, they probably see for themselves a secure, and perhaps promising, future in Morocco.²²

²²The return of the several hundred students who receive each year government scholarships for study abroad is evidently more problematic. In most cases, parents are required to post a bond, which is returned when the student comes home.

As education has worked as an agent of change, it has been increasingly an object of change, that is, shaped to satisfy requirements for trained manpower. Thus the emphasis on higher education and on vocational training that began to emerge in the late 1960's is being strengthened. Throughout the years middle-level educators have pressed for these developments, and those trained abroad have been in the front ranks of the movement. Divisions in the ministries of education have been headed by such graduates of the Sorbonne as Nacer al-Fazzi and Ahmed Salini, who in the early 1960's argued against Arabization and urged that the educational system be adapted to enable the young Moroccan to earn a living and "to have a wide opening into the modern world."²³ Many of these division chiefs are seemingly better qualified for their jobs than are the ministers. Abdelkrim Halim, who served recently as Minister of Higher Education, for example, went no higher than secondary school.

One movement in which these middle-level personnel have been instrumental is the establishment of special schools to meet labor market needs. Most of them—such as the School of Mines and the Hassan II Institute of Agronomy—are operated by the government but they are not integral parts of the school system. The most prestigious of these institutes is the Moroccan School of Administration. Organized to train personnel for the Moroccan civil service, it offers a three-year program for officials who have had four or more years of government service. Enrollment averages only about 250, but the program is reportedly of high quality.

These special schools, in some measure, substitute for a revamping of the regular system. Implementation of comprehensive change requires decisions from the top, and on this level the course is still misty. The frequent reorganization of the educational ministries (the higher education portfolio, for example, has disappeared and reappeared in the Cabinet, sometimes combined with vocational training and sometimes not) and the shifting of ministers deters the development of consistent and firm leadership. Yet increasing numbers of professionals are working in the educational field, and their sometimes improvised solutions to problems give evidence that they are working to meet national needs.

²³"Note de Presentation, Plan Quinquennal," Ministry of Education Files, quoted by J. William Zartmann, *Problems of New Power Morocco*, Atherton Press, New York, 1964, p. 181.

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B. The Emergence of the Professionals and the Managers

At upper and middle levels throughout the Moroccan government a meritocracy is developing, and the bureaucracy as a whole is increasingly subject to rational criteria of organization, recruitment, and training. It is becoming an important instrument for effecting change throughout the country.

When Morocco became independent its government was severely limited in what it could do by the quality and numbers of its civil servants. About 40,000 government positions, or roughly half of the total, were held by Frenchmen, who were distrusted by Moroccan officials and had been discredited before the public. To replace them, there were—according to an estimate of an early Prime Minister—3,000 qualified Moroccans.²⁴ Over the years the Moroccanization of the system has been accomplished in large part, and by the early 1970's the number of French employees, exclusive of teachers, was down to about 8,000.²⁵

Shortages persist, mainly at the middle levels, but qualified personnel are becoming increasingly available, and standards and recruitment criteria are rising accordingly. Advancement through the ranks is no longer unusual, and a few young technocrats—such as 37-year-old Taïeb Bencheikh, who has been working in economic planning since 1966 and was named Secretary of State for Planning in 1974—are, for the first time, attaining ministerial status. The system as a whole continues to lack administrative vigor, but charges of inefficiency and malfeasance have been less frequent in recent years. Basically, performance is improving with experience, and the bureaucracy, as it becomes institutionalized, is itself a new social grouping, providing for the individual a defined role in an organization actively engaged in national development.

The changing caliber of the provincial governor is one of the most significant indications of a new type of

personnel. In 1961 four of the 15 provinces into which the country was then divided were governed by members of the Alaouite family, i.e., fairly distant relatives whom Hassan presumably wanted to keep happy with administrative posts. Several other governors at the time were high ranking officers seconded from the army, and throughout the years most governors have had a background in the military or in the police. In 1972, however, Hassan appointed 13 new governors, and none had a security service background. Most had been either local officials, financial specialists, or teachers, and one was a private lawyer. They were unusual also because of their youth, eight of them being under 35.*

Below the governors are the *caids* and other agents of the Ministry of Interior who head the subdivisions of the provinces and coordinate the work of the service ministries throughout the country. Their qualifications for their jobs and the way in which they carry them out are probably more important than anything else in promoting a positive image of the government, for they are virtually the only representatives in actual contact with the population. The degree of their success in directing development projects and enlisting peasant support is difficult to determine, but increasing numbers of them receive special training for their jobs. The foremost school for this purpose is the Cadre School at Kenitra, which offers instruction in Berber dialects and in administrative subjects. In 1971 about one-fifth of the approximately 500 *caids* then serving had reportedly attended the Kenitra school.²⁶

Turnover in jobs is far less frequent among the governors and in other high-level government posts than it is in the Cabinet. Particularly in the government-controlled sector of the economy long tenure is coming to be the established practice, as the King takes increasing numbers of jobs out of his personal reward system and appoints personnel on the basis of competence. Even the essential phosphate business—the *Office Chérifien des Phosphates* (OCP)—was a frequently transferred sinecure in the early 1960's. One of its early directors was Mohammed Laghzaoui, now a prominent financier who was transferred to the OCP after having headed the *Surete Nationale*. Since 1967, however, the OCP director has been Mohammed Karim-Lamrani, a former Cabinet minister and specialist in corporate management. Success of the phosphate operations has been at-

²⁴Ahmed Balafout, *Al Iqtisad*, 30 March 1966, as quoted by Douglas Ashford, *Political Change in Morocco*, Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 121.

²⁵Employees of the Moroccan government, exclusive of teachers and those in the military and security services, number approximately 120,000. The ranks at the lower levels have been swollen by attempts to ease unemployment, but the higher salaries offered by the private and semipublic sectors for trained personnel have worked against the overstaffing of the civil service as a whole, which contrasts to the very large bureaucracies in many developing countries.

*Rabat, A. 297, 22 November 1972.

²⁶Frank Baumgardner, p. 184.

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tributed to his management by, among others, a West German banking concern which in 1974 agreed to finance a plant to produce intermediate phosphate fertilizers. Lamrani will serve as board chairman for the new *Miner-Phosphate* company.

The leaders among the Moroccan technocrats are still those with a foreign education, thus they are, for the most part, the sons of the well-to-do and elite families. Their interests, however, do not seem to center on the protection of their patrimonies, and they give evidence that the elite itself is changing. The new Secretary of State for Planning, Taïeb Bencheikh, who holds a degree from the National Institute of Economics and Statistics in Paris, for example, has been associated with Moroccan Communists²⁸—a fact perhaps reflecting his dissatisfaction with social conditions. In a sense, these technocrats represent a fusion between the traditional and the modern and an argument for the "reformist" approach to national development. As a professor of Mohammed VI University said, in criticizing the "negative sociological analyses of tradition," modernization is accomplished with less cost when it is carried out by the elite and when socialist revolution does not drive away educated and talented people.²⁹ The bureaucracy is nonetheless becoming less elitist, i.e., less devoted to the interests of the traditional elite, in part because foreign education has changed the outlook of some and in part because others have been recruited from a wider social spectrum. As the backgrounds of the employees become more diverse, the civil service is more closely tied to the impoverished masses and more representative of the nation.

Throughout the population as a whole, the increase in the numbers of those working in the professions and holding jobs associated with a modern economy is recorded in census statistics (see Table). Between the census of 1960 and the one taken in December 1971,

²⁸Rabat, Memorandum of Conversation, 1 July 1974, and CS 311-115202, 10 June 1969. Moroccan intellectuals have a history of flirtation with Marxism, but the weakness of the Communist movement in the country indicates that the attraction has few political repercussions.

²⁹Abdel Aziz Belaï, "Tradition et Modernisation: Le Cas du Maroc," *Renaissance du Monde Arabe: Colloque International* Catholic University of Louvain, 1970, p. 17.

Labor Force by Occupational Category

	1960	1971
Professionals and Technicians	3.0%	4.0%
Executive, manager, administrator, and allied personnel	0.5%	4.0%
Clerical workers	1.0%	na ^a
Merchants and salesmen	5.7%	7.6%
Service personnel	7.7%	9.1%
Farmers, laborers, loggers, and allied workers	57.0%	51.5%
Nonagricultural manual laborers	15.7%	19.1%
Not classified	7.6%	7.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

^aNot available. This category in the preliminary results of the December 1971 census was presumably included in the one cited above.

^bSource: *Résultats du Sondage au 1-10 du recensement* September 1972 and *Résultats du Recensement de 1960* July 1964.

the labor force—defined as those over 15 who are economically active—grew by some 700,000 to reach about 4 million in the latter year, or almost 26 percent of the total population, which was then about 15.4 million.³⁰ The 1 percent increase in the labor force of those working as professionals and technicians is thus relatively impressive in absolute terms: roughly, an additional 60,000 were holding such jobs in 1971. Moreover, the numbers of executives, managers, and allied workers had almost doubled.

The interlental period thus presents a nation making gains in the development and utilization of its human resources, and the pace of these gains appears to be accelerating. According to data assembled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), significant change in type of employment in Morocco was registered only after 1968, and between that time and 1973 employment in both manufacturing and in services grew by 4 percent.³¹

³⁰The 1960 census included in the labor force some 210,000 below the age of 15. For this reason, labor statistics cited from that census in some reports may differ from those given here, from which the number of those under 15 has been deducted to make the data comparable to the 1971 report. Actually both censuses underestimate those economically active. Many below 15 do in fact work, and many others are unpaid family workers who were not included in the statistics. A figure of about 5 million, based on US and UN estimates, is probably a more realistic counting of those working or seeking jobs in Morocco.

³¹IMF, *SMI* 74-52, 11 March 1974.

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IV. EVIDENCE OF CHANGE

A. The Improved Performance in:

1. The Economy

The economy has been doing better since the late 1960's (see table). Although free-wheeling has continued, with many projects arranged individually through high-level and sometimes sub rosa contacts, the government has strengthened its planning and guidance role. As the paralysis inherent in the large and heterogeneous Superior Council for National Development and Planning became apparent, the relevant government ministries took over planning, coordinated their efforts in a secretariat established in 1969 in the Prime Minister's Office, and submitted the results to the council for pro forma approval. The 1969-72 plan was the first one which met its targets, and the gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a rate of over 5 percent a year.

Elements of luck have figured in this economic improvement in Morocco, even before 1973 when phosphate prices began to rise. Agriculture still determines the overall level of economic activity in the country, and good crops, which result in additional income and increased demand, still depend largely on the weather. It was favorable between 1968 and 1972 and gave the economy a boost, but other factors were involved as well. The IBRD report for 1974 sums the matter up:

external influences certainly do not explain by themselves why Morocco was able to establish an improved record of economic growth. The answer has to be sought within the country—the natural and social environment, and the policies

which enabled the country's energies to become operative with more success.⁴²

Other comments in this report contrast with the 1964 critique (see above) and those made as late as 1970, when the IBRD examiners found that "the principal obstacles to better [economic] performance are the shortage of trained personnel and facilities and weak administration."⁴³ While the personnel shortage persisted in 1974, IBRD noted:

A small class of managers and entrepreneurs has been emerging—and begins to provide a sound basis for growth of private sector activity.⁴⁴

Western observers generally point out new efficiency in business dealings in Morocco, praising for example the work of the Office of Industrial Development, which renders service and aid to foreign investors.⁴⁵

The 1973-77 economic plan has also been praised by Western experts. This plan calls for GDP growth of 7.5 percent a year, and it is the first of the plans to admit that economic acceleration has been increasing income inequalities and to emphasize measures to effect a more widespread distribution of growth benefits. The poor are to be aided by, among other measures, expansion of small-scale irrigation projects, development of labor-intensive industry, and improved social services. While the Moroccan economy faces many problems, including tight money, inflation, and fluctuations in phosphate prices, its chances of coming close to the projected growth rate and to many of the plan's goals

⁴²Current Economic Pattern and Prospects of Morocco, Vol. 1, 7 February 1974, p. 1.

⁴³IBRD, Vol. 1, 30 September 1970, p. 12.

⁴⁴IBRD, 1974, p. 2.

⁴⁵Rabat, A 119, 11 October 1974.

Selected Economic Indicators

	1963	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Gross domestic product (billion of 1965 U.S. dollars)	1.6	2.6	2.7	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.9	4.1
Indices of volume of production (1965 = 100)										
Minerals	100	98	99	98	104	104	109	128	148	na
Manufacturing	100	105	108	113	123	123	141	146	166	na
Foreign sector (millions of current U.S. dollars, unless otherwise specified)										
Exports, F.o.b.	430	428	424	431	485	488	499	634	872	1,700 (est)
Of which phosphates (in percent)	23	25	23	24	22	23	23	26	26	55 (est)
Imports, c.i.f.	450	477	517	532	562	606	669	768	1,000	1,300 (est)
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves	99	87	78	85	114	140	174	217	267	430 (est)

na—Data not available

Note: Statistics were provided by the Office of Economic Research

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are considered fairly good by the IBRD and the IMF.⁴⁶ According to the reports of these organizations, the country's advantages are, in addition to natural resources and proximity to external markets, its entrepreneurship and its increasingly skilled labor force.

2. Land Reform

The long-range plan for rural betterment is land reform, and the need to revise land holdings in Morocco is undisputed. A survey in the early 1960's showed that 23 percent of the farmers were landless and that 4 percent of them owned a third of all land under cultivation. Almost 2 million acres were owned by foreigners, mainly French. The government began to nationalize or buy out this foreign-owned land soon after independence, but by 1964 only about 60,000 acres had been distributed and fewer than 4,000 farmers had benefitted.

After that time the government's performance in distributing land began to exceed tokenism (see table), and the 1973-77 plan calls for the distribution of approximately another 975,000 acres of the previously foreign-owned land. Yet the number of farmers who will benefit from the land is estimated at between only 30,000 and 50,000, with the size of the plots varying in accord with the productive capacity of the land.

Land reform is deterred in part by the political influence of the large Moroccan landowners. Their estates—both those in the family for generations and those purchased from the French when they

departed—are untouched, and none of the land reform decrees sets a ceiling on family holdings. The bureaucracy alone cannot move against such powerful interests, and the king avoids the hard decisions that would be necessary for comprehensive reform.

Yet other factors, too, hold up land distribution. There is no dispute about the previously foreign-owned land that the government has taken over, but efforts to distribute it, while increasing, still lag, largely because economic considerations make the technocrats reluctant to break up the large productive farms. A number of these farms are thus being operated by the government on a temporary basis, and the hired workers await the tenure that has been promised them.

Another basic problem is the inherent complexity of administering the distribution. As the small farmer does not benefit from the land unless credit and other services can be arranged, the Moroccan plan specifies the organization of cooperatives under the control of managers and extension workers appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture. And for these jobs the personnel is becoming available only slowly. The projected manpower needs of the Ministry of Agriculture during 1973-77 exceed by over 500 the number of technicians that the government even hopes to train in that time. Again, training and education must precede any realistic expectation of rural reconstruction or a new deal in the countryside.

3. The Promotion Nationale Program

One Moroccan program much studied in the West—the *Promotion Nationale* (PN)—follows the familiar pattern of a bad beginning and subsequent improvement. Initiated in 1961 with US food aid, this public works program aims at employing unutilized manpower in a productive fashion by undertaking such labor-intensive projects as land reclamation, small-scale irrigation, and road construction. In the mid-1960's, critics found that ministerial jealousies denied the PN the staff and the authority necessary to ensure the formulation of worthwhile projects and also that the poorer provinces were receiving the least benefits.⁴⁷

Both these faults had been largely eliminated by 1970, according to an on-the-scene examination of the program which showed that the PN had gradually

Land Distribution, 1957-72

Year	Approximate acres distributed	Beneficiaries
1957-60	20,213	1,262
1961	6,323	355
1966	12,903	691
1967	7,321	443
1969	41,865	1,471
1970	46,970	1,213
1971	77,447	1,864
1972	224,417	3,802
Totals	447,551	11,101

Source: IBRD, *Current Economic Position and Prospects of Morocco*, 7 February 1974.

⁴⁶IBRD and IMF, 1974, *opera cit.*

⁴⁷Douglas E. Ashford, *Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning*, p. 36 ff., and IBRD, 28 March 1967, Annex A.

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shifted its focus from relief to the creation of useful employment and had become an effective vehicle for the transfer of income from the richer to the poorer provinces.¹¹ Between 1963 and 1969 the shift of projects away from the better developed areas of the Casablanca Prefecture and Fes and toward the more needy ones was significant (see table). Overall, the program was characterized in the study as a "moderate success." Subsequently a report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Regional Distribution of Work days Provided by the Promotion Nationale (in approximate percentages)

Province or prefecture	Percentage of c. 11,700,000 work days in 1963	Percentage of c. 10,400,000 work days in 1969
Agadir	4	3
Al Hecema*	3	6
Beni Mellal	4	2
Casablanca**	4	3
Fes	12	5
Kenitra	6	6
Kenitra-Souk	6	12
Marrakech and Safi	12	4
Meknes	6	6
Nador*	3	7
Oranazate*	6	10
Oujda	6	2
Tanger	3	1
Taraya*	13	1
Taza*	4	6
Tetouan*	11	12
Casablanca Prefecture	7	17
Rabat-Sale Prefecture	1	1

*The poorer provinces of the country. They are in the underdeveloped south, east, and northern coastal and central areas. The country is dominated by the central and northwestern coastal provinces, especially Settat, Khourigga, Kenitra, El Jadida, and Beni Mellal. Together with the Casablanca and Rabat-Sale prefectures, in 1971 they provided for 48 percent of industrial employment.

**The province of Casablanca was divided in 1966 into El Jadida, Khourigga, and Settat. Additional provinces were created in 1975, raising the total to 28.

NOTE: The work days correspond to the employment of over 65,000 workers in 1963 and 95,000 in 1969 for 200 days. In fact, greater numbers were employed because teams of workers are rotated on most projects. Note also that the percentages do not add because of rounding. The source for the data is R. Andriamananjara, *Labor Mobilization and Economic Development: the Moroccan Experience*, University of Michigan, Ph.D. dissertation, 1971.

¹¹Rajaona Andriamananjara, *Labor Mobilization and Economic Development: the Moroccan Experience*, University of Michigan, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1971.

reached similar conclusions about the Moroccan program and compared it favorably, in several respects, to those conducted in Tunisia and Algeria.¹²

The PN continues, and the number of work days provided has been increased since 1969, although US food aid has been phased out and workers are now paid entirely in cash. Regional distribution of benefits remains roughly the same. The depressed southern semi-desert provinces, especially Ouarzazate, and the Rif mountain area of Tetouan and Al Hecema still receive the highest allocations. In efforts to discourage rural migration to the cities, the PN projects in the industrialized areas of Casablanca and Rabat-Sale have been further reduced in number.

4. Coping with Unemployment and Urbanization

These two problems are the greatest the nation faces. The performance of the government in coping with them cannot be measured in terms of accomplishments because the means at its disposal have been too limited and the problems themselves too intractable, given the rapid population growth. What is evident on the part of the authorities is new social awareness and realism, a willingness to formulate the problems and to try to deal with them.

Each year some 90,000 young workers enter the labor force. Many of them cannot find jobs, and they are joined by migrants to the cities who had previously been employed at least on seasonal tasks in the countryside. Although those working on the land declined as a percentage of the labor force (see the table above, Labor Force by Occupational Category), they increased in numbers by about 150,000 during the 1960-71 intercensal period. Rural living conditions deteriorated accordingly, and the exodus to the cities speeded up. Unemployment is thus greatest in cities, having grown from roughly 160,000 in 1960 to 216,000 in 1971, and it is as high as 16 percent of the labor force in Casablanca.

In view of the magnitude of the problem, it is surprising that the government is almost holding its own in coping with it, or has at least had some success preventing unemployment from becoming worse than it is. As a percentage of the labor force, unemployment

¹²Friedrich Kahner, *Public Works Programs and Development in North Africa*, OECD Development Centre, Paris, 1973.

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did drop during the Inter-censal period, falling from 9.4 percent to 8.7 percent of the total labor force⁶⁰ and from 20.4 percent to 15.3 percent of the urban workers.

The government has held unemployment down largely by stop-gap measures. Foremost among them is the *Promotion Nationale* and, second, are the arrangements for workers to go abroad for work. Registered departures for jobs in Europe, usually France, number 125,000 annually, and others leave unofficially. An estimated 300,000 to 500,000 are now working abroad and benefitting the Moroccan economy by the remittances they send home.

Neither of these measures is any real solution to the problem. Sending workers abroad renders Morocco increasingly vulnerable to ill effects from a European recession; and the PN represents for the workers only an alternative to doing nothing. There is no evidence that it has "promoted" workers to an improved status, as the name of the program implies it should. Few learn skills or gain access to a more remunerative occupation.

While increasing its allocation to the PN, the government is also trying hard to generate more jobs. It is, for example, screening manufacturing investments for their employment effect, augmenting its support program for handicrafts, and emphasizing build-up in the service industries, which include tourism and are good potential employers. The 1973-77 plan calls for the creation of some 800,000 jobs, an undoubtedly optimistic target. And even if it is achieved, the number of those without jobs, while declining as a percentage of the labor force, will be greater than it is today. For the most part, they will continue to crowd the cities, subsisting on hand-outs from families and friends.

Statistics show the magnitude of urban growth and the extent to which it is changing the character of the country. Between the census of 1960 and the one in 1971 urban population increased by 2 million to reach 5.4 million, a growth rate of 58 percent compared to 21 percent in rural areas. Rural migrants number about 80,000 a year and half of them go to the five large cities on or near the Atlantic coast (see map).

⁶⁰Statistics on unemployment in both the 1960 and the 1971 census are too low and also carry a degree of precision not warranted by the basic data. Some US estimates put unemployment as high as 20 percent of the labor force, and many more are underemployed.

While the cities of the coastal area were growing at an alarming rate, the government throughout the early and mid-1960's abstained from action to improve the environment. The policy, if it can be called that, was one of deliberate neglect on the theory that failure to provide urban housing or services would discourage potential migrants. Officials either adopted an ostrich-like attitude or spoke of the expanding *bidonvilles* (literally, tin-can towns) as a blot on the national character and attempted to keep them out of sight on the outskirts of the cities.⁶¹

A new approach to urban problems began to evolve in 1967. At that time the Department of Urban Planning and Housing was transferred from the Ministry of Public Works to the far more powerful Ministry of Interior. Subsequently, additional funds were made available to municipal authorities, and self-help construction programs were initiated. The some 100,000 low-cost housing units constructed between 1968-72, however, provided for a very small part of the rural influx and underscored the necessity for more comprehensive government action. In 1972 a special ministry for housing and urban affairs was created, and the 1973-77 plan indicates heightened preoccupation with the cities. Investment in urban development is over 10 times that provided in the previous plan, and a start has been made in using these funds. The housing deficit for families with a monthly income below the equivalent of \$40 has reportedly been brought down from the 235,000 units estimated in 1972 to about 200,000, and for those with slightly higher incomes some 300,000 units are to be available by 1978. Construction involves a reportedly efficient system of cooperation between the bureaucracy and local firms and authorities,⁶² perhaps increasing the chances for plan fulfillment.

Urban problems, while they will remain serious for years to come, are being alleviated, and the government is trying to slow rural-urban migration by such means as offering jobs in the countryside under the *Promotion Nationale* program and also by improving amenities in the towns and smaller cities. The last census did show that the percentage of migrants to the big urban centers was dropping, with more of them moving to smaller cities with populations of 50,000 to 100,000 than had previously been the case.

⁶¹Katherine M. Johnson, *Urbanization in Morocco*, International Urbanization Survey: the Ford Foundation, 1971, p. 50 ff.

⁶²*Ibid.*, pp. 106 and 134.



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B. Social Trends

The improvements that are taking place do not add up to widespread transformation of the society. Although the educated class—broadly defined as those over 20 who attended a modern secondary school—grew in number from under 100,000 in 1960 to about 400,000 in 1971, its members are not sufficient to offset the cultural inertia and poverty that handicap development. In a country such as Morocco, where the population is increasing at a rate of 2.9 percent a year, the class that is growing most rapidly is the unskilled poor, and among them new ways of life and new linkages in inter-personal and inter-class relationships are developing only slowly. The influx to the cities and the swelling urban population do not signal a differentiated proletarian or fundamental social change. To measure such change among the poor and the uneducated, i.e., the great majority of the Moroccan people, signs must be found that the citizenry as a whole is working to enhance the chances of a more rewarding life in a complex environment. These signs are not many, but a few of them are significant.

One of the signs is a slight decline in the fertility rate of women throughout the inter-censal period of the 1960's. In that time the proportion in the total population of children under 10 declined from 35 percent to 32.4 percent. This decline is not sufficient to point to a fall-off in the rate of population increase but indicates only that the population would be larger than it now is if previous fertility levels had remained constant. The drop may have been influenced by the government's family-planning program, although that program has not been pushed, in part because of conservative opposition from the *Istiglal*, and has amounted to little more than the establishment of clinics. It is more probable that the decline is part of the cumulative process of change and an indication of greater awareness on the part of women.⁵¹

Better education and new values are advancing the concept of female emancipation, as indicated by the following statistics.

	Approximate numbers of girls in primary schools	Numbers in secondary school	Women in the labor force
1960	160,000	30,000	165,000
1971	350,000	80,000	320,000

⁵¹ This hypothesis is supported by a study made in the Meknes area by Robert J. Lapham, *Fertility Determinants in the Semi-Plains of Central Morocco*, University of Michigan, Ph.D. dissertation, 1970. He showed that receptivity to family planning correlates highly with such factors as radio listening.

In percentage terms, women participants in the labor force increased from 5 percent to 8 percent of the total, and many women working in the fields and at other chores were not included in the census statistics. Moroccan women have always had a greater measure of independence, particularly in Berber areas (where few wear face coverings, even in the towns) than those in some Arab countries, and polygamy, never common, has almost disappeared. Change among them, however, is slow. Few attend school in the countryside (only 84,000, according to the last census), and 87 percent of all women were still illiterate in 1971.

In rural areas, illiteracy did not drop even as much as it did among women. It was 88 percent, or just 3 percent lower than in 1960, in contrast to a drop from 73 percent to 56 percent in the cities. Greater numbers attend school in the countryside, but the literates are the ones who go to the cities, indicating that the introduction of a type of education more suited to rural life may be a way to cut down on the destabilizing urban influx.⁵²

This "brain-drain" is one factor limiting the impact of change in rural areas, many of which remain centers of conservatism. Education there is still slanted toward the traditional and the religious, with over 40 percent of the pupils in Tetouan, Marrakech, and a number of other provinces attending Koranic schools. The tendency to resist change persists, and it is apparent in the suspicion with which outsiders are regarded. Some interesting evidence along this line was provided in 1973, when UNEP dissidents, financed by Libya, went into the Middle Atlas area and attempted to foment rebellion. Their efforts fizzled, largely because the peasants turned them over to the gendarmes. Whatever the motivation of the peasantry, the appeals of the liberals from the cities were apparently not effective.

The interests of the peasantry focus on local needs, and they do not often relate them to national concerns. Meetings of the communal councils are a case in point. The two-headed executive provided by the Moroccan law on local government gives authority to the appointees of the Ministry of Interior, but the elected councils of the same 500 communes into which the provinces are divided continue to meet. Their members generally are not qualified to debate the local budget, which is their sole legal power. They do, however, take advantage of the meetings to raise

⁵² The study of education called for in the 1973-77 plan will consider this problem, and the possibility of emphasizing such subjects as farming techniques and health care in rural schools.

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specific grievances. The political scientist Douglas Ashford, who studied the council meetings in the mid-1960's, found them effective in such matters as replacing incompetent or lazy market officials and restricting privileges of the local police. His conclusions point to the beginnings of change in the countryside:

These grievances were very likely voiced by members of the council who were already more accustomed to modern forms of controversy and governmental procedures, but they were still part of the demonstration that a virtually defenseless villager could successfully withstand the force of government within legally constituted channels.

The fact that the Moroccan citizen has this small chance to participate in regulating his own community means, of course, that he has taken an irremovable step toward the operation of a modern community.⁴⁴

Change is thus slow to come in rural areas, but a development structure exists which allows a degree of criticism and may eventually increase the peasant's realization that his and the nation's interests coincide. Advance along similar lines is more pronounced in the towns and cities, particularly in meetings of the UMT locals. Observers of these meetings found that union members do articulate their complaints and demands, which are then aggregated at higher levels of the organization.⁴⁵ The group identity and common interest thus established indicate that individuals are becoming aware that their positions will be bettered by bettering those of their trade and skill; but it is a learning process that must, in many cases, overcome the traditional divisions of the society and will take time.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Evidence adduced in the preceding sections portrays the process of change in a country which had maintained medieval patterns of behavior well into the 20th century. Many factors will affect the nature and pace of change in the future. Important among them are the flexibility and adaptability of a society accustomed to autonomy in much of the daily routine of life. There are external factors as well, such as the

economic health of Europe and the world market for phosphates.

While the outlook for Morocco is promising, it is too early in the process of change to permit confident predictions as to how the nation will fare in the next decade. Assessments of the future are thus necessarily problematic and impressionistic. They can perhaps be rendered more precise by examining the likely course of further social change and considering various economic and political contingencies.

A. Further Social Change

In the course of the 1973-77 plan, Morocco should be able to prevent deterioration of living conditions among the rural and urban poor.⁴⁶ Social ills will not be substantially eased for decades to come, but generally the gap between their existence and action to protest them is wide. A family-oriented society such as Morocco's can tolerate high levels of unemployment, and the record of the past several decades, especially in the Muslim world, has shown that *bidonvilles*, or shums, are not often the prime locus of protest and revolution. Though the shums will not be eliminated, the stabilization of conditions there represents a considerable achievement, given the rate of population increase. It means that welfare measures will be expanded and that some of the poor will move into the middle class in the 1980's and 1990's.

The middle class is still small in size. Probably the best estimate of its numbers comes from an analysis the newspapers of the political parties worked out in the early 1970's to attack the government on the issue of inequitable income distribution.⁴⁷ Their data on salaries and on farm income indicated that only between two and three million were living fairly well above the subsistence level.

As the educational system improves, the size of the middle class is increasing. The problem of inadequate schooling, usually in liberal arts, which has bedeviled the second post-independence generation and raised the numbers of educated unemployed is being slowly overcome. In the 1980's and 1990's the third post-independence generation will be coming of age, and the chances are that those among them who have been

⁴⁴National Development and Local Reform, Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 49-55.

⁴⁵Robert D. Fort, for example, attended UMT meetings in the Kenitra area and incorporated his findings into his Ph.D. dissertation: *Labor and Traditional Politics*, University of Texas, 1970.

⁴⁶IBRD and IMF, 1974, *opera cit.*, pp. iv and 15-20, respectively.

⁴⁷2 March, 1971. These studies are slanted politically to underestimate the numbers receiving a good income, but in the absence of official data they are sufficient to indicate roughly the economic divisions of the society.

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educated will have the type of training necessary for a career role in the economy or in the bureaucracy. The government continues to emphasize vocational and higher education and, to this end, has deferred the goal of universal school attendance until 1995. It plans instead for 500,000 to be in secondary school by 1977 and for 100,000 to be attending universities by 1990, and past performance indicates these goals are realistic.

This educated middle class, with the elite, will be intent on making life rewarding, on strengthening itself economically and, in the long term, politically. To what extent will this class seek to keep the rest of the society at bay, impoverished and without influence? A tendency along this line has been evident, but it is weakening as the historic sense of nationhood acquires new meaning. The axioms of the West concerning the general good have now been too widely accepted to be ignored. Social ills, moreover, receive attention in Morocco, for the political press will not let the bureaucrats forget them. The politicians themselves are drawn from these middle and upper classes and, though they have no power now, they seek constituencies as spokesman for the poor and they do not hesitate to point out social wrongs. Meanwhile, the elite itself is changing as it takes in those who acquire influence and/or wealth and who are unfamiliar with that web of familial, commercial, and political ties that has tended to close the group off from the rest of the society.

New attitudes would encourage more dramatic action on land reform; and it may now be easier for the technocrats to take such action, for wealthy landowners are turning increasingly to business and commerce and are perhaps less tenacious about keeping their holdings than they once were. It has been roughly estimated that establishing ceilings of about 40 acres on family holdings would provide enough land to benefit between 135,000 and 200,000 farm families, representing one-third to one-half the landless farm laborers.⁵⁹ Almost 65 percent of the people in Morocco still live on the land, and giving security of tenure to increasing numbers of small farmers is probably more likely than anything else to promote the upward spiral of self-confidence and self-help that brings fundamental social change to a country.


The social improvements which have taken place are not large in themselves, but they are incremental. And the course of social change has acquired a mo-

mentum of its own which should be enough to carry the country forward for quite a few years. Whether it will now speed up or slow down will be determined by what happens in the economy and in politics.

B. Economic Determinants

Morocco is better able now to finance development and to improve living conditions than it has ever been (see chart). The increase in phosphate prices in the past

GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 1965-75



Sources: IMF report, 11 March 1974, updated by Rabat, A-22 and A-43, 26 February and 11 April 1975

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three years is bringing the country large amounts of money (almost \$1 billion in 1974). This income represents about a third of budgetary receipts and more than half the nation's foreign exchange earnings.

The phosphate boom means that Morocco is better off than the developing countries which do not produce oil, but it is not sufficient to assure good times ahead. As a result of the worldwide jump in commodity prices, a large part of the phosphate revenues is taken up by current expenditures, covering increases in salaries and in the cost of subsidies on bread, sugar, some other foods, and petroleum products. The high rate of investment spending which is being achieved—and which in the long term builds the industry and supplies the jobs—still depends largely on loans and grants. At present, the expansionist budget projected for 1975 is endangered by the drop in the phosphate prices, even though the decline is slight. It was brought on by the increased production of other countries and by the slowdown in European buying.

A recession in Europe is a danger to Morocco, for the nation has an arrangement of association with the European Communities (EC), and those countries are its main sources of aid and investment and its main trading partners. In addition, they employ some 300,000-500,000 Moroccan workers. If substantial numbers of these workers return home, the balance of payments would suffer from the loss of their remittances, which amounted to about \$370 million in 1974. Also, the economy would have difficulty in absorbing the workers, especially those who had acquired no skills in Europe.

Another danger is drought. Rainfall still determines the size of the grain crop; production was down in 1974, and wheat imports are using up revenues targeted for development. The growth of overall agricultural production has kept up with the population increase, but about 30 percent of the output, consisting mainly of citrus fruit, is exported.⁶⁰ Government resources have been concentrated on the export crops and the drier, grain-producing parts of the country have been neglected, but the rise in grain prices and the end of the P.L. 480 shipments may occasion a re-ordering of priorities. While vulnerability to drought will not be eliminated, increasing amounts of farmland are being brought under irrigation and small-scale projects benefitting the drier areas are already being emphasized.

⁶⁰IBRD, 1974, *op. cit.*, p. 63 and table 7.1.

Economic success cannot be predicted at this time of worldwide strains, but certain elements appear to be sufficiently favorable to keep social advancement going at its present pace, or perhaps faster. On the positive side are the facts that Morocco provides between 35 and 40 percent of the world trade in phosphates and that a high level of demand appears firm, despite fluctuations. According to some specialists in minerals, only Morocco and the Spanish Sahara in the long term have reserves for export that are large enough to satisfy this demand.⁶¹ Moreover, Morocco stands a good chance of increasing its income from this resource within the next four to five years as it takes over a larger share of processing the phosphate rock into fertilizers.

This phosphate production and processing may portend a community of interests with the oil-rich Arab states. As petroleum byproducts are used in producing fertilizers, the possibility opens up for cooperation in the establishment of chemical complexes. Morocco offers a reasonably attractive climate for foreign investment, and visits of economic missions have been exchanged with Saudi Arabia and with the Persian Gulf states. Already the oil-rich countries are aiding Morocco, and prospects for future beneficial arrangements are good. Saudi Arabia's Faysal thought highly of Hassan, and his successors and the conservative rulers of the Gulf probably share this view.

Morocco's long-term planning emphasizes agricultural improvement and the expansion of manufactured exports and tourism. Its fastest growing industries are food-processing, construction materials, and chemicals, and it is advantageously positioned to increase exports to the EC countries. Its accessibility to Europe, plus its relatively low rate of inflation, is also helping it to maintain tourism at a higher level than its competitors, although the number of visitors has dropped slightly below the approximately 1.5 million who came to Morocco in 1973.

The economy will also benefit if the 1973-77 plan succeeds in effecting greater equality of income. Studies made in connection with the plan showed that 50 percent of the households in 1971 accounted for only 18 percent of consumer spending, and the hope is to increase their consumption by an average of over 3 percent a year. This shift in income toward those

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⁶¹ [REDACTED] 6 November 1974. Uncertain factors (e.g., alternative sources for fertilizers) make it impossible to forecast the development of any sort of cartel arrangement in the phosphate trade.

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whose propensity to consume local goods is greatest would have a buoyant effect on the economy, stimulating demand and eliminating such problems as unutilized capacity in the textile industry. Overall economic betterment may thus be in store, although Hassan's forecast of economic "take-off" is undoubtedly optimistic.⁶²

C. Political Alternatives

The Moroccan past shows a pattern of relatively long periods of surface calm broken by violence: the riots of 1965, during which several hundred lives were lost, and the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972. Veteran observers have thus come to expect the unexpected. This time, however, the calm may continue for an even longer time, with no meaningful political change and with the monarchy acting neither as a promoter of social change nor as a barrier to it. Alternatively, the state of Moroccan politics in the future could be more important in promoting societal change—or in deterring it—than it has in the past.

1. The Status Quo

To date, the role that the monarchy has played has at least given the society time to overcome its historic divisiveness and to build slowly an educated and responsible citizenry. Thus the monarchy, with all its faults, has not served the nation badly. It has provided an institutional framework within which various factions could co-exist, and it has probably been more successful than a single-party regime would have been in containing tensions and the pressures for pluralization. One reason for this success is that the legitimacy of the King's position has discouraged others from seeking a monopoly of power.

Even in the cities, where Hassan has undoubtedly lost support over the years, the religious prestige of the King is still important. And for the tradition-minded countryside he is a sort of supernatural authority, possessed of *baraka*, or an aura of holiness bestowed by Allah. An assessment made of the Moroccan view of Hassan not long after the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972 probably remains accurate:

The throne is a symbol of legitimacy, and the King is held in awe as the inheritor of a great dynasty and as the mystical incarnation

tion of national sovereignty. His very presence is thought to bring blessing (*baraka*), and his narrow escapes from death, first from over a thousand men, and then from jet fighters, are seen as proof of divine favor. He fascinates his countrymen...⁶³

The social change that has been taking place under the present system will probably lead eventually to meaningful political change, but not for a long time (say, 25-30 years). As the past has shown, the pressures for participatory government will not disappear, and the chances are that Hassan's successor will find it easier and safer to accommodate them than to thwart them. On the other hand, change could come sooner.

2. A "Semi-Liberal Regime"

Hassan could begin to build the "semi-liberal regime" he claims he now has.⁶⁴ The restoration of parliament—if it takes place in 1976, as the King has suggested—would not effect his own commanding position, but it might be more important in the long term. It would have propaganda value for the politicians, perhaps helping them to revitalize their organizations. Such a development would at least keep open the channels through which the present group of politicians, most of whom have been on the scene since independence, could be replaced by more effective leaders. Moreover, if the politicians were allowed once more to seek votes, they would bring new groups into politics. In the countryside in particular, they would probably work through the communal councils to relate local needs to national interests, and they might supply the political push that seems to be necessary for meaningful land reform.

In the longer term (say, a generation), one possibility is the evolution of a division of government responsibilities roughly comparable to the one prevailing in Turkey since 1961, when the military restored civilian authorities. Like the Turkish military, Hassan, so long as he had the army behind him, could continue to control foreign affairs and defense, leave the domestic running of the country to parliament and Cabinet, and remain ready to step in when their actions were not to his liking. Although his authority would be exercised behind the scenes to a greater extent than it is at pres-

⁶²Interview on Egyptian television, *FBIS Daily Report*, 21 March 1975.

⁶³██████████ 29 November 1973.

⁶⁴Hassan's press conference, *FBIS Daily Report*, 19 September 1974.

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ent, he would be far more visible as a guiding force than the Turkish military, for he is the religious leader of the country and the symbol of its unity. In a sense, he would withdraw as a political protagonist in favor of greater emphasis on the role of arbiter that Moroccan monarchs traditionally held. With age (Hassan will be in his fifties in 1980), such a position might appeal to him, and it would have the advantage of shielding the monarchy from criticism and attack.

Morocco might be better prepared for such change and for the evolution of a truly "semi-liberal regime" than many countries. Some regimented, usually single-party, societies in underdeveloped countries have an easier time than Morocco has had in mobilizing efforts for national betterment, but their records show difficulties both in sustaining the hegemony that has been achieved and in adapting to a broadening of political participation. In Morocco, however, disparate groups are experienced in the arts of persuasion, compromise, and protest, and this experience may be promoting the attitudes necessary for the success of pluralistic government. In the long term, Morocco could become a notable combination of monarchical and modern systems of authority.

Many pre-conditions would have to be met for any or all of these positive developments to come about. Hassan would have to change his methods and give up some of his power. Much would depend on a new relationship of trust between the politicians and the King and a rise in his popularity and sense of security. The students and the intellectuals, in particular, do not like Hassan. Their protests have decreased in number since mid-1973, but riots and demonstrations were frequent in the past. Such disorders threaten the regime only if the security forces and the army join in or refuse to suppress them. While the troops could not be counted upon to put down riots endlessly, in the event of seriously deteriorating conditions, the military would be more likely to act on its own to oust the King than to support others in doing so.

3. A Coup

The spectrum of alternatives to Hassan's rule is not wide. The concept of his critics that he will somehow be replaced by a reformist, progressive, and secular democracy is unrealistic, for the forces that might form such a government in Morocco are weak, divided, and totally incapable of seizing power. Any sudden political change will come from the military. Although information on the attitudes of the military is too sparse to

support speculation on what would provoke a coup, some potentials for trouble are evident.

Hassan, like all Moroccan monarchs, is the guardian and defender of the nation's territory, and any appearance of failure to fulfill this role might well antagonize the military. Morocco is one of the few Arab countries which has had irredentist claims, not only to the Spanish territories but also to Mauritania and large parts of the Algerian Sahara. Although the claim to Mauritania was settled by recognition of that country in 1970 and the Moroccan-Algerian border, while still not demarcated, appears to be accepted by both governments, irredentist sentiments are still strong. Hassan is playing upon them in reviving the claims to the Spanish Sahara and also to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The Spanish Sahara, in particular, is his trump card in restoring domestic unity.⁶⁰ It is also a risk to his position. Spain wants independence for the area, and it has Algerian support. Hassan is thus in danger of provoking his militarily much stronger neighbor. At best, success in taking over the Spanish Sahara without some prior agreement with Algeria would severely strain relations between the two countries. On the other hand, failure to win some part of the claim would result in Hassan's loss of face before a dissatisfied Moroccan public.

Yet both these dangers are minimized by the caution with which Hassan has raised the claims. The UN committee dealing with colonial areas has been asked to examine the question of Ceuta and Melilla, and Morocco has not made a major issue of the case. The Spanish Sahara, which Morocco has treated as a major issue, has been referred to the International Court of Justice to determine the precolonial status of the territory. Hassan fears precipitous Spanish withdrawal. He wants a political solution, to be worked out slowly. In the meantime, the claim rallies loyalist support for him.

Hassan would also be in trouble with the military if he failed to give full backing to the Arabs against Israel. The riots protesting Morocco's noninvolvement in the 1967 war showed that the nation was not removed from the contagion of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indicating he had learned his lesson, Hassan sent troops to fight in Syria in 1973, and this move turned out to be perhaps the most popular of his reign.

⁶⁰For a full discussion of this issue, see Interagency Memo, *Spanish Sahara: Pawn of Northwest Africa*, 6 September 1974.

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A coup, if it comes, would result in at least temporary setback to the social and economic advance of the nation. Hassan's ouster in itself would occasion no great outcry. As the French proved when they interfered with the succession early in their protectorate, the religious esteem accorded a monarch does not amount to personal allegiance; and *baraka*, if bestowed by Allah, can also be taken away or transferred to the King's son. Yet resistance to the new leadership might well develop in the wake of a coup. The concept Hassan has of himself holding together congeries of feuding groups is doubtless exaggerated, but with his passing others might see their chances to win authority against a weak regime. The result could be a round-robin of coups or islands of local resistance. This resistance, if it developed, would almost certainly not have the aim of secession and it would not be drawn along ethnic lines. The Arabs and Berbers are too intermixed in the society to divide nationwide into opposing groups although, in the event of a breakdown of law and order, local conflicts between them are a possibility. Probably the resistance would be disorganized and low key, but it would be sufficient to trouble a new regime.

The specific effect a coup would have depends largely on the orientation of its leaders. Possibly they would be radically inclined, although such ideologies are out of keeping with the temper of the times in the Arab world, where the trend is away from revolutionary dogmas and extremist policies. If the leaders should be junior officers, even if they were not radicals, they would probably seek a new order and not try to preserve the monarchy. More importantly, they would distrust the bureaucracy and the technocrats generally, tied as many members of this group are to the established elite. Shake-ups would extend to the middle levels of most organizations and mean a loss of talent and skill that Morocco can ill afford. The result would be economic setback and a slow-down in the developmental process.

If the coup leaders should be senior officers, they would probably be basically conservative and they would probably not sweep the monarchy aside. They would be likely to attempt a palace coup, perhaps making the regicide appear an accident.⁶⁶ They would then rule through the Crown Prince, who will come of age in 1981. This course would offer the advantage of preserving legitimacy and continuity, it would make it easier to win the support of the tradition-minded citizens, and it would leave the technocrats to continue their work.

Any military regime—whether radical or conservative—would control the political parties more closely than Hassan does and would probably suppress them altogether, in favor of building its own organization. The mutual distrust between the politicians and the military that has long existed in Morocco would operate against the formation of political alliances. The new leaders would also distrust an independent labor organization. The UMT leaders think they would be the first targets of the military,⁶⁷ and they are probably right.

Political change in Morocco then will be either violent, in the form of a coup, or gradual under Hassan. He will not liberalize his regime soon, and he may never do so. Yet forces within the society are slowly developing the capabilities for responsible, participatory government, which may eventually encourage Hassan, his successor, or any regime that replaces him, to share power.

The societal change which is taking place in Morocco, without top-level government direction and initiative, will continue, either under Hassan or in the event of a coup. Military leadership, in fact, might be more efficient in effecting some aspects of change. In the long range, however, the social development of the country is best promoted by any regime which, first, improves economic conditions among the people and, second, does so without destroying the various interest groups now functioning. Hassan's government has lagged in the first respect, although its efforts are improving. A military regime would almost certainly fail in the second and might not do better in the first. The balance favors Hassan.

⁶⁶Such a scenario has a precedent in the 1972 coup attempt. At that time air force officers tried to shoot down the King's plane, with the evident expectation of causing a crash at sea.

⁶⁷██████████ 10 January 1974

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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

c. 693

Arab raiders enter Morocco through the Taza gap

711

Forces under the leadership of the Arab governor Musa Ibn Nusayr and his Berber subaltern Tariq invade Spain

c. 749

Moulay Idriss, a descendant of the Prophet, establishes the first Moroccan dynasty and extends hegemony over most of the northern part of the country

c. 1000

Arab tribes of the Hilal invade Morocco

1002

Berber tribes seize Marrakech, beginning five centuries of succeeding dynasties: the Almoravid, Almohad, Marinid, and Saadian

c. 1570

Sultan Abd al-Malik is influenced by the Ottoman Turks, who then controlled the rest of the Maghreb, but he resists their domination

1664

Moulay al-Rashid becomes the first strong ruler of the Alaouite dynasty, which started to rise to power about 1660

1787

Morocco and the United States sign the Treaty of Marrakech, settling differences resulting from pirate seizure of US ships

1912

Treaty of Fes establishes the French protectorate; Spanish zones are recognized in the north and south and the existing international status of Tangier is accepted

1927

French bypass the heir-apparent to place Mohammed Ben Youssef on the throne, believing him to be amenable to their control

1943

Founding of the Istiqlal party

1953

Exile of Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef (later King Mohammed V) and his replacement by the puppet Sultan Ben Arafa

1954-55

Urban terrorist groups and a rural Liberation Army fight for Moroccan independence; Mohammed V returns

1956

Formal independence is granted by France to the French Protectorate of Morocco

Spain relinquishes control over Spanish Protectorate of Morocco

International status of Tangier is revoked and zone is integrated into Morocco

1959

Spain relinquishes control over the southern Spanish zone of Morocco

1959

Forces under Hassan, then Crown Prince, put down insurrection in Rif mountains

Istiqlal splits and leftists form National Union of Popular Forces

1960

US military assistance program is initiated

1961

King Mohammed V dies, and Hassan II is enthroned

1962

Morocco's first written constitution becomes effective, following approval by popular referendum

1963

The first parliament is elected

Moroccan territorial claims lead to 3-week border war with Algeria

1965

Student demonstrations in Casablanca escalate into violent antigovernment riots joined by the unemployed and by young militants from opposition factions. Violence spreads to Fes but not to other cities. About 250 are killed, 4,000 injured, and 800 arrested

King dissolves parliament and declares a State of Exception (*Etat d'exception*).

Mehdi Ben Barka, exiled UNFP leader, is kidnaped and presumably murdered in Paris

1966

Hassan visits Moscow. Four conventions are signed, including a general economic aid agreement

1969

Spain and Morocco sign the Treaty of Fes in which Spain agrees to return to Morocco the enclave of Ifni

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1970

King Hassan promulgates a new constitution and lifts the State of Exception. Elections, boycotted by the major parties, are held for a new unicameral legislature, which consists mainly of independents.

1971

High-ranking army officers lead an unsuccessful coup attempt against King Hassan at his birthday celebration at Skhirat palace. Loyal forces under the direction of Maj. Gen. Mohammed Oufkir restore order within a few days.

1972

King Hassan promulgates a new constitution but makes no promise on a date for new elections. The King escapes another attempt on his life when three

Moroccan Air Force F-5's try to shoot down the plane bringing him from France.

The suicide, but probable murder, is reported of the coup plotters, General Oufkir, who had been the Interior Minister and strongman of the regime.

1973

Moroccan dissidents attempt to foment a rural insurgency.

Moroccan troops join in the October Arab-Israeli war, fighting in Syria.

1974

Hassan speaks of plans to restore parliament. He also revives claims to the Spanish Sahara, confronting Madrid's plan to grant increased autonomy to the area. UN refers issue to the International Court of Justice.

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